Una política tributaria muy particular en Luxemburgo

The Unusual Luxembourg Tax Break That Lets Firms Profit From Loss

TOM BERGIN, REUTERS

General view of the city of Luxembourg October 11, 2013. Luxembourg's voters will take to the polls in a general election on October 20.


LONDON (Reuters) - "Life in Luxembourg is simply different," says its government website. The same could be said of tax in the Grand Duchy. It's known for its generous tax policies, but what's less familiar is a Luxembourgrule that lets companies cut their income taxes using costs that they haven't actually borne - a break offered by almost no other state.

The rule, which dates back to World War Two, helps companies save hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes each year, a Reuters analysis of the accounts of several major international corporations shows. The profits that escape tax have often not been earned in Luxembourg, but in countries like Britain, the United States and Germany. Those countries may lose out.

New York-listed telecoms group Vimpelcom, U.S. internet group AOL Inc., building equipment maker Caterpillar and UK mobile telecoms group Vodafone are just four of those to have made use of the system, accounts for theirLuxembourg subsidiaries show. Other firms have similar arrangements, tax advisers say, but have not made them public.

What these firms can do that companies in most other countries cannot is use notional losses - like a fall in thevalue of an asset that a business still holds - to cut their corporate income tax. In other countries, such an asset would have to be sold, so that the loss is realized, before the company could use it to reduce its tax bill. The only other country to offer a similar tax break is Switzerland, according to 20 tax advisers from a dozen countries interviewed by Reuters; but they said the Swiss are more restrictive.

In the European Union, where some countries use tax incentives to attract corporate investment, Luxembourg's rule is a unique lure. Tax advisers say it has helped attract more than 40,000 holding companies and thousands of high-paying jobs for the population of nearly half a million.

"For a government that wants to collect taxes ... this is just a stupid idea," said Reimar Pinkernell, tax partner in Flick Gocke Schaumburg in Bonn. "But if you don't want to collect taxes, if you are just happy that the company is there, and employs some people, then this is a perfect system."

The leaders of the Group of 20 biggest economies pledged in September to close some international loopholes in company tax, but their plans won't target country-specific practices like Luxembourg's. EU sources said in September the European Commission, the executive arm of the EU, wrote to Luxembourg, Ireland and theNetherlands asking for details of tax deals they had cut with foreign companies, to see if they meet competition rules.

Tax advisers point out that other countries offer different tax breaks to attract investment. The LuxembourgMinistry of Finance said its tax rules are sensible, and not intended to help companies shift profits from other countries.

"A lot of countries use tax competition," said Heather Self, partner at law firm Pinsent Masons in London. "There's nothing wrong with it and there's nothing wrong with companies taking account of different tax rates. Tax is just another cost of business."

Spokespeople for the U.S., UK, French and German finance ministries declined to comment or said it would be inappropriate to comment on another country's tax rules. A spokesman for the EU Commission said the issue was not one it has examined in detail.

AN "INTERNAL BANK"

Here's how the rule works. If a company makes an investment, say it buys another firm, and the business turns out to be worth less than it paid, the company will follow international accounting rules to reduce, or write down, thevalue of the asset in its accounts. In countries like Britain and the United States, that impairment does not generate a tax saving. But in Luxembourg it does.

The case of Dutch-based Vimpelcom Ltd, one of the biggest phone operators in Russia with operations inCanada, Italy and North Africa, shows how firms can benefit.

At the end of 2012 a Vimpelcom subsidiary, a holding company called Weather Capital Sarl, made a 1.1 billion-euro ($1.51 billion) write-down in relation to some shares it held in a subsidiary, Weather Capital Special Purpose 1 Sarl, also a holding company. It also reported an 840-million euro decline in the value of a loan it had made tothe holding company.

Under Luxembourg rules, those two losses could save hundreds of millions in tax.

But the loss doesn't give a saving on its own: It must be offset against profits. And Luxembourg's domestic market is too small to make much profit; Vimpelcom doesn't even have a telephone business there.

So the company found another way to benefit.

In January this year, it told investors at a presentation in London that it planned to establish an "internal bank" that would borrow money and lend it on to operating units around the world, to fund their investments.

Henk van Dalen, its Chief Financial Officer at the time, said the company planned to route $13 billion to $15 billion of loans each year through the new financing unit. The in-house bank would generate large profits by charging more in interest than it had to pay. And these profits would escape tax because the financing operation would be based in Luxembourg, where Vimpelcom had big tax losses to use.

The "tax saving" would be $200 million to $250 million each year, van Dalen said.

Vimpelcom declined to comment or answer questions about its Luxembourg operations. Van Dalen did not respond to requests for comment.

It could go on indefinitely, van Dalen told the London meeting, a video of which is available on the company website. "Of course, at a certain moment you will run out of these tax losses and then there will be a new phase developed for the financing company," van Dalen said.

One investor on the video described the structure as "fairly ingenious."

But University of Connecticut School of Law Professor Richard Pomp said the system made no sense. "It's absurd," he told Reuters of the Luxembourg rule. "It gives the taxpayer too much control in managing their tax bill."

AOL'S LUXEMBOURG MOVE

Luxembourg's practice was actually inherited from Germany and dates back to the occupation of the Grand Duchy during the Second World War, said Ministry of Finance spokeswoman Veronique Piquard.

Indeed, Germany allowed companies to create such tax losses until 2001, although Berlin was less generous, German tax lawyers say.

Another difference was that while Germany gave deductions for write-downs, if a firm made a profit when it sold an investment, the company would be taxed on that.

In Luxembourg, if the investment goes up in value or is sold at a profit, the gain isn't taxable. Pomp, the University of Connecticut professor, calls that a "one way bet" for companies. "There should be symmetrical treatment," he said. "This is a pure tax incentive."

Tax advisers say Germany changed its approach because it stopped taxing capital gains, so it no longer made sense to give a deduction for losses. Piquard said Luxembourg's treatment of write-downs was not a tax incentive and the tax authority only gave deductions for write-downs which were justified.

The deductions can be quite quickly arranged, as illustrated by the case of internet group AOL Inc.

AOL told investors in its 2009 annual report that it was experiencing weakness in its European display advertising business.

In 2010, it transferred ownership of several European advertising subsidiaries from a British to a Luxembourg-based company.

Months later, that company, AOL Europe Sarl, wrote down the value of the advertising units as part of a 27-million-euro impairment. It then offset this against royalty income totaling 6 million euros, which could otherwise have incurred tax of almost 2 million euros.

Had AOL left the units with the British holding company and taken the losses there, it would not have received any tax benefit.

Piquard declined to comment on individual companies' tax affairs. AOL also declined to comment.

CATERPILLAR'S CONSOLATION

Boosting the appeal of Luxembourg's rule is the fact that many takeovers - more than half, according to some studies - don't work out for the acquirer.

Take Caterpillar, which shocked investors in January by writing down almost all of the value of ERA Mining Machinery Ltd., a Chinese company it agreed to buy for more than $653 million in 2011. Caterpillar cited alleged accounting irregularities at an ERA subsidiary, and the write-down wiped out more than half its earnings for thefourth quarter of 2012.

However, there was some consolation for Caterpillar investors, because the deal was structured through aLuxembourg holding company.

The write-down generated a tax deduction of $445 million that could be used to offset Caterpillar's future income in Luxembourg.

Caterpillar declined to comment.

VODAFONE'S PROFITS POWERHOUSE

One of the most successful users of the Luxembourg rule is Vodafone. The losses it built up in Luxembourg are so big the Grand Duchy's approach to taxing write-downs has helped it save billions of euros in taxes over thepast 13 years.

Vodafone became the largest mobile phone company in the world after a buying spree in the late 1990s, with deals such as the $180 billion takeover of Germany's Mannesmann AG. After the tech bubble burst, Vodafone had to write down these assets.

They were held in Luxembourg, which meant that the 70 billion euros in charges it reported could be used to offset future profits.

These have been significant. Since Vodafone's first write-downs in the year to March 2002, just four VodafoneLuxembourg subsidiaries have earned almost 30 billion euros.

Two have been like Vimpelcom's "internal bank". Vodafone Luxembourg 5 Sarl (VL5), made $15 billion in profits from lending to the group's U.S. arm, while Vodafone Investments Luxembourg Sarl (VIL) made 18 billion euros lending to affiliates such as Vodafone's German arm. Interest payments are tax deductible in the United Statesand Germany, so the U.S. and German units' taxable income, which could have exceeded 60 billion euros, was also reduced by this arrangement.

More recently, two other Vodafone subsidiaries have gone beyond lending, to start business operations inLuxembourg. The firms - Vodafone Procurement Company Sarl (VPC) and Vodafone Roaming Services Sarl(VRS) - trade phone equipment and telephone bandwidth between affiliates and external suppliers. Their 300 staff generated an average 1.7 million euros per head in profit in the year to March 2013, compared with a group average of around 44,000 euros per worker.

Combined, these arrangements mean Vodafone reports more profit in Luxembourg than it does in any other country apart from the United States, group accounts show.

And thanks to the tax losses it has built up in Luxembourg, it has paid only around 100 million euros in tax since 2001. If Vodafone had paid the headline tax rate on this profit, it would have faced a bill of almost 9 billion euros.

Vodafone said it did not use contrived arrangements to shift profits. "Vodafone acts with integrity in all tax matters and operates under a policy of full transparency with the tax authorities in every country in which we operate," thecompany said in a statement.

Head of Group Media Relations Ben Padovan said the profits reported in Luxembourg reflected genuine economic activity there and the arrangements had no impact on Vodafone's UK tax bill.

Vodafone added that the decision to hold its investments and base its inter-company financing in Luxembourgreflected a variety of factors including the country's location within the euro zone, "the stability and predictability ofthe tax, regulatory, social and political environment and the availability of relevant skills within the labor market."

If companies do use Luxembourg's rules to avoid taxes in other countries, said Luxembourg tax lawyer Thierry Lesage, then it was up to other countries to change their systems.

The system is "really part of the DNA of the Luxembourg holding (company) taxation system," he said. "As a sovereign state Luxembourg is allowed to determine its fiscal policy."

($1 = 0.7283 euros)

(Edited by Sara Ledwith and William Waterman)

Business Insider

Citas citables en Economía

Top 10 de Citas sobre Economía 
por Geoffrey James

Expertos largo de la historia proporcionan una valiosa perspectiva sobre la crisis fiscal de la actualidad.




Dado que la economía mundial está al parecer a punto de irse al diablo en cualquier momento, pensé que podría ser útil para que los expertos opinan sobre el tema :

1. "Poco más se necesaria para llevar a un estado al más alto grado de opulencia partiendo de la barbarie más baja que la paz, impuestos sencillos y una tolerable administración de justicia."
Adam Smith

2. "Hay una regla para el industrial y que es: hacer los mejores productos de calidad posible al menor costo posible, al pago de los salarios más altos posibles . "
Henry Ford

3. "Sabemos que las economías avanzadas con gobiernos estables obtienen préstamos en su propia moneda son capaces de llegar hasta muy altos niveles de deuda sin crisis."
Paul Krugman

4. "La riqueza excedente es un deber sagrado que su poseedor está obligado a administrar en su vida por el bien de la comunidad."
Andrew Carnegie

5. "La producción de demasiadas cosas útiles da lugar a demasiadas personas inútiles."
Karl Marx

6. "Ningún siervo puede servir a dos señores. Porque o aborrecerá al uno y amará al otro, o será fiel a uno y despreciará al otro. No podéis servir a Dios y a las riquezas."
Jesús de Nazaret

7. "Nos estamos acercando rápidamente a la etapa de la última inversión: la etapa en la que el gobierno es libre de hacer lo que le plazca , mientras que los ciudadanos pueden actuar sólo con permiso."
Ayn Rand

8. "Los reclusos son tratados con TV por cable, comidas calientes y una educación universitaria , mientras que en el exterior algunas personas sólo pueden permitirse estas cosas a través de una vida de crimen."
Alfred E. Neuman

9. "Una deuda nacional, si no es excesiva, será para nosotros una bendición nacional".
Alexander Hamilton

10. "El hermetismo [de la economía] no es tal vez sin intención. Da empleo al fin a dialécticos que de otro modo podrían convertirse en una carga pública o, en el peor de los casos, en estafadores y embaucadores".
Jack Vance

Inc.com

La pérdida del poder financiero en 3 casos ilustrativos

How 3 Countries Lost Their Position As The World's Dominant Financial Power Over The Last 800 Years

BRYAN TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DATA

Global Financial Data has put together an index of government bond yields stretching back seven centuries. This index uses government bond yields from the leading economic powers of each century to measure the long-term changes in government bond yields.

The Changing Center of Financial Power

Over the past eight centuries, the locus of economic power has gradually shifted from Italy to Spain to the Netherlands to Great Britain and currently to the United States. The country at the center of the world’s power and economy issues bonds to cover expenses. Investors in that country and abroad purchase the bonds because they represent the safest bonds that are available for investment.

The country at the center of economic power can issue more bonds at a lower cost because of the lower risk of the world’s economic center. Over time, power ebbs away from that country and investors begin placing their money in the bonds of the new world economic power.

Italy was the center of the western economic world until the 1500s. Until then, the Mediterranean was the gateway to Byzantium, the Middle East, and through those countries, to India and China. The Italian city-states of Venice, Genoa, Florence and others grew from this trade, but also fought wars against each other requiring funds for those wars.

By the 1600s, the nexus of economic power had shifted to the Netherlands as trade in the Atlantic and with northern Europe enabled the Dutch to strengthen their role in the global economy. The surplus of capital in the Netherlands is illustrated by the fact that Tulipmania, the world’s first bubble, which occurred in the Netherlands in the 1630s.

The Netherlands was too small to maintain its role as the center of the global economy for long, and the combination of trade, and commercial and industrial revolutions moved the center of economic power to Great Britain at the end of the 1600s. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 realigned political power in England and put Britain on a sound economic footing that enabled it to remain the center of world economic and political power until 1914.

After World War I, the center of economic power clearly shifted from London to New York and today, New York remains the center of the global economy. The Dollar is the world’s reserve currency, a fact that enables Washington to issue bonds at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case.

GFD’s Index of Government Bonds

Global Financial Data has put together an index of Government Bond yields that uses bonds from each of these centers of economic power over time to trace the course of interest rates over the past seven centuries. From 1285 to 1600, Italian bonds are used. Data are available for the Prestiti of Venice from 1285 to 1303 and from 1408 to 1500 while data from 1304 to 1407 use the Consolidated Bonds of Genoa and the Juros of Italy from 1520 to 1598.

General Government Bonds from the Netherlands are used from 1606 to 1699. Yields from Britain are used from 1700 to 1914, using yields on Million Bank stock (which invested in government securities) from 1700 to 1728 and British Consols from 1729 to 1918. From 1919 to date, the yield on US 10-year bond is used.

Bond Yields Over Time

Bond yields are determined by a number of factors. These include 1) the growth in real GDP, 2) the inflation rate, 3) supply and demand factors, and 4) risk.

The yield on a risk-free government bond should equal the growth in nominal GDP since that represents the opportunity cost of holding a government bond both in terms of investment opportunities (real GDP) and the time value of money (inflation). Higher levels of growth or higher inflation will lead to higher interest rates. Increases in the number of bonds (demand for savings) will lead to higher interest rates, while increases in savings will lead to lower interest rates. Finally, the perceived riskiness of the bonds can lead to higher interest rates. Investors may fear that the government may fail to pay back the bonds, reduce the real cost of the bonds through inflation, or depreciate the currency as a way of reducing their cost. All of these factors can impact the price of Government Bonds, and thus their yield.

The trend over the past seven centuries has been for bond yields to decline. This can’t be attributed to lower economic growth or lower inflation, but must clearly be attributed to lower risk of default. Between 1285 and the mid-1600s, yields on government bonds fluctuated between 6% and 10% and in some cases were around 20%. Because there is little data on government bond yields before the 1700s, the spikes in yields that occur can be attributed to specific events that affected the issuers, generally the risk of default stemming from wars that occurred. It may very well be that yields on other securities were lower at different points in time up to the 1700s, but the paucity of data makes it difficult to determine this. Nevertheless, the trend is clear.

Since 1700, well developed markets for bonds have existed in London and New York enabling the yields on government bonds to be traced with accuracy. Since the mid-1600s, the average yield on government bonds has been around 4%. Before the 1600s, high interest rates were driven by risk; since the 1600s, high interest rates have been driven by inflation.

Being the center of economic power provides benefits to that country because it can issue bonds at a lower cost than a country in the periphery. In the long run, this can lead to over issuance of debt if the country chooses to take advantage of its position by issuing excessive debt to investors in other countries.

With the mushrooming US government debt, some people are beginning to wonder whether the United States will be able to maintain its position as the world’s central economic power. Before looking at the United States, let’s look at government bond yields in Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain in the past.

Wikimedia Commons

The port of Genoa in 1481

Italian Bond Yields

Because of the paucity of data from before 1700, bond yields as given in Sidney Homer’s A History of Interest Rates, are used. The two principal sources are the Prestiti of Venice (Figure 1) and the Consolidated Bonds of Genoa.

During Medieval times, governments used taxes on trade and revenues from monopolies, on salt for example, to cover expenses during regular times, but inevitably wars broke out leading to the need to raise additional money. The government would have to find some way to force nobles and businessmen to hand over money to cover the costs of war.

Genoa and Venice used “forced loans” as a way of raising funds from its citizens. The two city-states consolidated these forced loans and allowed creditors to trade these forced loans on open markets turning them into modern-day bonds. The debts had no maturity date, but during periods of peace, the governments would use surplus revenues to retire some of these debts.

Governments that met interest payments on their forced loans, paid off debts during peace times, and did not default on these debts could establish confidence in their debt, enabling them to issue more bonds in the future. As Venice prospered, it increased its ability to service its loans. Venice established a fund to repurchase Prestiti, floated voluntary loans when necessary, borrowed in anticipation of future tax collections, and established a credible record of repayment. This enabled the cities of Venice and Genoa to borrow money at 6%-10% during Medieval times and during the Renaissance, rather than the 10%-15% that other rulers had to pay.

Global Financial Data

Dutch Bond Yields

As the center of trade shifted out of the Mediterranean and into the Atlantic after 1500, the center of economic power shifted as well. The rulers of Spain, France and England had periodically defaulted or forced loans on their subjects, and failed to establish a record of regular repayment of loans that would have enabled them to become the financial centers of Europe.

Wikimedia

The Dutch East India Company

The Netherlands successfully liberated itself from Spain between 1568 and 1648. The Dutch established the Dutch east India Company in 1602 and the Dutch West India Company in 1621. The Netherlands didn’t have to pay for an expensive court, fought their wars at home rather than abroad, profited from international trade, and saved money. The Amsterdam Exchange dealt not only in shares of the Dutch East India Company and Dutch West India Company, but in government bonds as well.

Most securities were in the form of Annuities issued by the individual provinces, the United Provinces and the towns. This is the essential way in which Dutch lending differed from Italian lending. The Italian credit system relied upon a system of private international banking. The Medicis and other commercial bankers would lend their funds to states, knowing the risks involved. The Italians also had officially chartered banks that intermediated deposits and loans.

Outside of the Italian city-states, loans to heads of state were basically personal loans that clearly ran the risk of default. Spanish, French and English kings borrowed when they had to, defaulted when they couldn’t pay, but had no system of drawing upon the savings of the public. The Dutch, on the other hand, developed state finance based upon the government’s ability to pledge its revenues against the annuities they had issued.  Having no royal court, and relying upon local governments, the Dutch paid off loans on time with little risk of default. As risk declined, interest rates fell to 4% (Figure 2), the lowest they had ever been in history, and a rate consistent with the low level of default risk that governments enjoy today.

Global Financial Data

English Government Bond Yields

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 transformed England politically and economically. Unlike his predecessors, William III was a constitutional monarch. Though he had no pretensions to absolute personal power, and though in theory he borrowed on behalf of the English people, he also represented the Whig mercantile interests which backed him and dominated Parliament. The Bank of England was established in 1694, borrowing at 8% (when Dutch rates were at 3-4%), and in 1720, the attempt to convert existing government debt into shares in the South Sea Company created the South Sea Bubble. By the 1740s, interest rates had declined to the 3% range and in 1751 the 3% British Consols were issued, which are still traded in London today.

As can be seen by the graph of long-term interest rates, the risk of default on British debt has been almost non-existent as illustrated by the consistently low interest rates, except in time of inflation. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s Government debt as a share of GDP exceeded 200%, but government bond yields stayed below 6%. After 1815, British capital funded canals, railroads in the UK, America and other countries, mines in Latin American, Britain’s colonies and foreign bonds issued by every government in the world. Since there were no major wars or fiscal crises in the UK after 1815, Britain’s Government debt shrank to 20% of GDP by 1914. Interest rates on government bonds fell below 2.5% in 1896, enabling Britain to reduce the interest rate on its Consols to 2.5%.

Other countries also benefited from the decline in interest rates. The United States, Germany, France and other countries were all able to issue government debt at 3% by the end of the 1800s, whereas at the beginning of the 1800s, 5-6% or even more was the norm. Small government, due to few or small wars, combined with shrinking government debt reduced the risk of default and lowered interest rates throughout the world.

United States Bond Yields

World War I shifted the world’s financial center from London to New York. In 1915, British bond yields rose above American yields and have remained that way ever since. The United States has never defaulted on its Central government bonds, so rises in bond yields have been driven mainly by higher rates of economic growth, inflation, and the supply and demand for government bonds.

There are several clear trends in government bonds in the US during the past 100 years. From 1902 to 1920, bond yields rose from 2.82% to 5.67%, with most of the increase occurring between 1914 and 1920 due to the risks of war and inflation. From 1921 to 1945, interest rates fell from 5.67% to 1.55% due to deflation, depression and the manipulation of bond yields during World War II by the government. From 1945 to 1981, interest rates rose from 1.55% to 15.84%. This was the highest level for government bond yields in almost 500 years as inflation spiraled out of control due to Keynesian economic policies. Between 1981 and 2011, bond yields fell from 15.85% to 1.46%.

Bond Yields in the Twenty-First Century

What will this chart look like at the end of the 21st century? The clear driving factor for bond yields over the past seven centuries has been the responsibility or irresponsibility of national governments. From Venice and Genoa to the Netherlands, Britain and the United States, when governments kept borrowing to a minimum and paid off their debts, interest rates fell, benefiting not only the national, but the global economy. Capital was freed up for the private sector which contributed to the success of the industrial revolution. The 1700s and 1800s had the lowest interest rates in history. The 1900s enjoyed both some of the lowest and the highest interest rates (Figure 3), depending upon the level of inflation generated by the government. Since the risk of default is low, it is inflation and the supply and demand for bonds that has driven interest rates since the mid-1700s.

Global Financial Data

Government bond yields reached their lowest levels in history in 2012, dropping below 1.50%. Whether bond yields start to rise from here will depend upon the behavior of the government and its willingness to balance its books. US government debt has increased to over 100% of GDP. This is no guarantee that interest rates will rise since investors flee to US Government Debt as a haven of safety. Britain’s debt exceeded 200% of GDP after the Napoleonic Wars and Japan has run deficits for 20 years with its government debt edging toward 200% of GDP.

Nevertheless, Britain paid off its debt during the 1800s keeping interest rates from rising. Japan has seen no growth in nominal GDP during the past 20 years, and has been able to rely upon domestic savings to fund its growing government debt. Currently, there is no prospect that the United States will begin to pay off its debt as Britain did in the 1800s, and low interest rates are little consolation if your economy is not growing. When the economy returns to more normal growth rates and the rest of the world becomes less risky, government bond yields will rise.

Even if the United States were to suffer the fate of Japan and fail to grow for the next 20 years, which is unlikely, its inability to fund its debt domestically, and the inevitable growth of China, India and other emerging markets, is likely to drive growth and interest rates upward in the decades to come. Although the United States may not default on its debt, it can reduce the burden through inflation or depreciation. If this were to occur, the balance of financial power could shift again. Whether United States bond yields are used in this graph at the end of the 21st Century, or those of China, India or some other country will depend upon the fiscal constraint or profligacy of the US Government.

As long as investors perceive that the United States remains the center of the world’s economy with little risk of default, the United States can continue to benefit from low government bond yields, but if US government debt continues to grow and another economic center develops which is perceived as being safer than the United States, the US could lose its role as the center of the global economy and all the benefits that go with it.

Global Financial Data

This post originally appeared at Global Financial Data. Copyright 2013.

Business Insider

Inteligencia y pobreza. Algunas brechas se cierran

¿Prefieres nacer inteligente o rico?
Un estudio reciente de Brookings sugiere que los cerebros y la conducción tienen más que ver con el éxito de toda la vida que la riqueza de la familia. Pero hay una gran cierre de la brecha.
JORDAN WEISSMANN

Reuters

Lo sé, lo sé, uno tendría que nacer más inteligente y rico (y encantador, y con una cabeza brillante de pelo, y una voz como la de Michael Bolton). ¿Pero si tuviera que elegir? Es probable que su respuesta depende de si usted piensa que la economía de EE.UU. es una meritocracia , que la inteligencia y la ambición son más importantes para el éxito de toda la vida que las circunstancias de su nacimiento.

Un reciente documento Brookings da motivos para el optimismo. En el largo plazo , que encuentra, niños inteligentes ganan más que los niños ricos . Pero, lamentablemente , hay una gran captura .

El papel Brookings examinó la relación entre el cerebro , la motivación y la movilidad económica entre un grupo de jóvenes que el gobierno empezó a registrar en 1979. Aquí está el resumen : Si son luminosas y conducido, pobres niños tenían una posibilidad decente de llegar a ser de clase media- alta, o mejor. De los adolescentes de bajos ingresos que obtuvieron en el tercio superior de los examinados en la prueba de calificación de las Fuerzas Armadas ( en el extremo izquierdo en verde) , más del 40 por ciento lo hizo a los dos primeros quintiles de ingreso en la edad adulta . Mientras tanto , los niños dimwitted de la riqueza en general cayeron en la escala económica . Entre los adolescentes de altos ingresos que obtuvieron en el tercio inferior de los tomadores AFQT ( en el extremo derecho en naranja ) , más de la mitad terminaron en los dos quintiles más bajos de ingreso.



Los cerebros no lo eran todo, por supuesto. A medida que los investigadores ponen , "en términos de movilidad, es mejor ser inteligente, motivado, y rico, que inteligente, motivado, y pobres." Y, como señalan los autores, también parecía ser un "suelo de cristal" que mantiene un gran número de niños ricos con "habilidades mediocres" en caer en la pobreza (relativa).

Sin embargo, para los adolescentes y adultos jóvenes de finales de 1970, la economía parece haber sido, al menos en algún sentido significativo, una meritocracia.

Ahora sobre esa recorte en la brecha. La triste verdad es que, más a menudo que no, los niños ricos son los chicos listos. Desde hace muchos años, la brecha más grande en la educación estadounidense se ha situado entre los pudientes a - y los pobres. Gracias a los recursos de sus familias pueden verter en la crianza , los estudiantes ricos comienzan académicamente antes del día en que entran en jardín de la infancia , y mantenerse a la vanguardia a través de su día de graduación de la escuela secundaria .

Cómo enorme es la división de clases en nuestras aulas ? El siguiente gráfico Brookings debe darle un sentido . Muestra cómo pre- escolares, la escuela media, y los escolares de secundaria en edad les va en los exámenes cognitivos , como la AFQT , dependiendo de sus ingresos familiares. La tendencia debe ser bastante claro de un vistazo : los niños más ricos obtienen mejores calificaciones . Por su adolescencia , seis de cada diez niños de la rebanada más rico de las familias colocan entre el tercio superior de los examinados , seis de cada diez niños de la porción más pobre de las familias colocan en el tercio inferior. Son imágenes de espejo de la riqueza y la perspicacia .



Esta es una razón clave por la que los Estados Unidos tiene una escasez de movilidad económica, en general , incluso si nuestra economía es nominalmente meritocrático. Simplemente no hay muchos niños pobres que tienen las habilidades para luchar contra su camino a la cima. Y es por eso que gente como presidente de la Reserva Federal , Ben Bernanke, han comenzado a cuestionar la idea de que la meritocracia es, por su naturaleza, justo. ¿Cómo puede un sistema justo realmente , después de todo, si se inclina hasta ahora en favor de quienes tienen la suerte de haber nacido rico?

The Atlantic

El fin del efecto compromiso en la era digital

Hay poder en todos los comentarios de usuarios
Por Matt Richtel

Usted ya no es el tonto que solías ser .

Así lo sugiere al continuar con la investigación de la Escuela de Negocios de Stanford sobre los retos que enfrentan los vendedores para llegar a los consumidores en la era digital. Como se puede sospechar , la investigación muestra que una gran cantidad de información en línea de productos y comentarios de usuarios está provocando un cambio fundamental en cómo los consumidores a tomar decisiones.

Dado que los consumidores confían más el uno del otro, el poder de los vendedores está siendo socavado, dijo Itamar Simonson, profesor de Marketing y principal investigador de Stanford.

En el estudio, a los participantes se les preguntó cuál de las tres cámaras Canon les gustaría comprar. Antes de decidir, se les permitió pasar unos minutos de leyendo los comentarios de los usuarios y otra información sobre estas y otras cámaras en Amazon.com.

Para obtener el impacto total de los resultados, primero hay que conocer las conclusiones de hace décadas experimentos similares del Dr. Simonson en Duke University. En ella, algunos sujetos tenían que elegir entre tres cámaras Minolta: una barata, una de precio medio y una costosa. Otro grupo se le dio la opción de sólo dos de los Minoltas: la de precio medio y la menos costosa.

Los investigadores encontraron que cuando los sujetos del estudio tenían sólo dos opciones, la mayoría optaba por la cámara más barato con menos funciones. Pero cuando se les daban tres opciones, la mayoría eligió la del medio. Dr. Simonson lo llamó "el efecto de compromiso" a la idea de que los consumidores gravitan en torno a la mitad de las opciones que se les presentan.

El estudio mostró cómo los vendedores pueden manipular a los consumidores. Sólo mediante la presentación de tres opciones con precios diferentes, podrían lograr que los consumidores gravitaran en torno a una de precio en vez de una más barato. Este hallazgo llevó más Dr. Simonson y otros estudiosos para describir el comportamiento generalizado como "irracional" por los consumidores que toman las decisiones no basándose en el valor real de un producto, sino de cómo el artículo fue presentado en relación con otros productos.

Ahora volvemos al nuevo experimento. Era similar al primero, excepto que los consumidores podrían tener un vistazo a Amazon. Eso hizo una gran diferencia. Cuando se les da tres opciones de cámara, los consumidores no gravitaron en masa a la versión de precio medio. Más bien, el menos caro mantuvo su cuota y el del medio perdió más respecto a la más cara.

"El efecto de compromiso se ha ido", dijo el doctor Simonson, o, mejor dicho, casi exclamó la ausencia del efecto, lo que subraya su sorpresa ante los hallazgos. Han de ser publicado el próximo mes en "Absolute Value", un libro del Dr. Simonson y Emanuel Rosen.

Hoy, los productos se están evaluando más en su "valor absoluto, su calidad," dijo el Dr. Simonson. Las marcas significan menos. Los resultados sugieren que las empresas deben gastar menos dinero tratando de dar forma a las opiniones de los consumidores en los anuncios tradicionales, dijo, y más en la comprensión de qué y quiénes están dando forma a esas opiniones.

Ran Kivetz , profesor de Marketing de Columbia, que hizo su tesis doctoral en Stanford con el Dr. Simonson, llama a los nuevos hallazgos como "muy significativos", pero ve un problema: las herramientas digitales pueden cambiar el efecto de compromiso, pero fortalecen a las empresas de otras maneras, dejando que recojan datos de los consumidores y aumenten de información instantánea sobre lo que el marketing trabajan ideas. En teoría, se podría llevar a una más poderosa, si bien más sutil, manipulación.

"Si soy un vendedor y quiero manipular opciones usando el efecto de compromiso, me será más difícil", dijo el Dr. Kivetz . "Pero hay otro lado, que es que es más fácil para el vendedor presentar información de diferentes maneras y para aprender rápidamente lo que la gente responde".

New York Times

Econ 101: 5 reglas doradas de las finanzas

Las 5 reglas doradas de las finanzas

MORGAN HOUSEL, THE MOTLEY FOOL


Soy dueño de un libro de texto de finanzas, y de vez en cuando me abro para recordarme a mí mismo lo poco que sé acerca de las finanzas. Está lleno de complejas fórmulas de precios de opciones, la función cópula gaussiana, y un capítulo titulado "Evaluación de límites de confianza de los valores seleccionados de los modelos - valores complejos." No tengo literalmente ni idea de lo que eso significa.

¿Debiera molestarme que haya tanto sobre finanzas que yo no sé? No lo creo. Como John Reed escribió en su libro Succeding :

Al empezar a estudiar un campo, parece que tienes que memorizar un millón de cosas. No lo sabes. Lo que necesita es identificar el núcleo principios -generalmente de tres a doce de ellos - que rigen la materia. El millón de cosas que pensé que tenían que memorizar son simplemente diferentes combinaciones de los principios básicos.

Evolución que dice mucho acerca de la biología. Un puñado de los sesgos cognitivos a explicar la mayor parte de la psicología. Del mismo modo, hay algunos principios básicos que explican la mayor parte de lo que necesitamos saber acerca de la inversión.

Aquí hay cinco que vienen a la mente.

1. El interés compuesto es lo que te hará rico. Y eso lleva tiempo.

Warren Buffett es un gran inversor, pero lo que lo hace rico es que ha sido un gran inversor por dos tercios de siglo. De su actual $ 60 mil millones el patrimonio neto, se añadió $ 59.7 mil millones después de su cumpleaños número 50, y 57 mil millones corresponden a después de su 60a. Si Buffett comenzó a ahorrar unos 30 años y se retiró de unos 60 años, se habría nunca más se supo de él. Su secreto es el tiempo.

La mayoría de la gente no comience a ahorrar en cantidades significativas hasta una década o dos antes de la jubilación, lo que limita seriamente el poder del interés compuesto. Eso es lamentable, y no hay forma de arreglarlo de forma retroactiva. Es un buen recordatorio de lo importante que es enseñar a los jóvenes a empezar a ahorrar lo antes posible.

2. La única variable que afecta más grande retornos es valuaciones - y no tienes ni idea de lo que van a hacer.

Rendimientos del mercado de futuros será igual a la rentabilidad por dividendo + crecimiento de las ganancias + / - cambio en el múltiplo de beneficios (valoraciones). Eso es realmente todo lo que hay que hacer.

La rentabilidad por dividendo que sabemos: En la actualidad es del 2%. Una conjetura razonable de futuro crecimiento de las ganancias es del 5 % anual.

¿Qué pasa con el cambio en múltiplos de ganancias ? Eso es totalmente imposible de conocer.

Los múltiplos de ganancias reflejan los sentimientos de la gente sobre el futuro. Y simplemente no hay manera de saber lo que la gente va a pensar en el futuro en el futuro. ¿Cómo pudiste?

Si alguien dice, "Creo que la mayoría de la gente va a estar en un 10 % mejor estado de ánimo en el año 2023, " nosotros los llamaríamos delirante. Cuando alguien hace lo mismo mediante la proyección de la rentabilidad del mercado de 10 años, los llamamos los analistas.

3. Simple es generalmente mejor que inteligente.

Alguien que compró un bajo costo S & P 500 índice de fondos en el año 2003 obtuvo un rendimiento del 97% a finales de 2012. Eso es genial ! Y ellos no necesitan saber nada acerca de la gestión de carteras, análisis técnico, o sufren a través de un único segmento de " La Ronda de iluminación. "

Mientras tanto, los pantalones de fantasía neutrales de mercado promedio de capital de fondos de cobertura perdieron 4,7 % de su valor en el mismo período, según datos de Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge índices de los fondos. El fondo de cobertura promedio de capital de largo-corto produce un rendimiento total de 96 % - sigue siendo la altura de un fondo de índice.

Invertir no es como una computadora : Simple y básico puede ser más poderoso que complejo y de vanguardia. Y no es como el golf : Los espectadores tienen una muy buena oportunidad de humillar a los profesionales.

4. Las probabilidades de que el mercado de valores que experimentan una alta volatilidad son 100 %.

La mayoría de los inversores a entender que las reservas producen rendimientos superiores a largo plazo, pero a costa de una mayor volatilidad.

Sin embargo, cada vez que - cada vez - incluso hay un toque de volatilidad, el mismo clamor se oyó desde el público inversionista : " ¿Qué está pasando ?"

Nueve de cada diez veces, la respuesta correcta es la misma: No pasa nada. Esto es justo lo que las existencias hacen.

Desde 1900, el S & P 500 ha regresado alrededor de 6% al año, pero la diferencia promedio entre el cierre más alto de cualquier año y cerca de más bajo es del 23%. Recuerde esto la próxima vez que alguien trata de explicar por qué el mercado está arriba o abajo por unos pocos puntos porcentuales. Ellos son, básicamente, tratando de explicar por qué llegó el verano después de la primavera.

Alguien le preguntó una vez JP Morgan lo que hará el mercado. "Va a fluctuar" que supuestamente dijo. Palabras más verdaderas nunca se han hablado.

5. La industria está dominada por manivelas, charlatanes y vendedor.

La gran mayoría de los productos financieros son vendidos por personas cuyo único interés en su riqueza es el monto de los honorarios que le puede lechón fuera de.
Usted no necesita ninguna experiencia, credenciales, o incluso el sentido común para ser un experto financiero. Tristemente, más fuerte y más grandilocuente un experto, más atención que recibirá, a pesar de que le hace más propensos a estar equivocado.
Esta es quizás la teoría más importante en las finanzas. Hasta que se entiende que tienen una alta probabilidad de ser engañado y confundido por todas las esquinas.

"Todo lo demás es queso crema."

Business Insider

Documental: Guan Jondred Dollar (México)

Fantasías monetarias de ayer y hoy: Guan Jondred Dollar

Cortometraje mexicano dirigido por Antonio Galicia sobre una historia que nos remite al flujo circular de la renta...

Path dependency en las ciudades europeas

Why Many Cities Are Located In The Wrong Place

GUY MICHAELS, FERDINAND RAUCH, VOXEU.ORG

The world is urbanising rapidly (World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision). Some of its rapidly growing cities, however, seem to be misplaced. They are located in places hampered by poor access to world markets, shortages of water, or vulnerability to flooding, earthquakes, and volcanoes.

This outcome – cities being stuck in the wrong places – has dire economic and social consequences. When thinking about policy responses, a key research question is whether historical events can leave towns trapped in suboptimal places.

New research on a historical ‘experiment’

Our recent research looks at this issue by comparing the evolution of two initially similar urban networks following a historical calamity that wiped out one, while leaving the other largely intact (Michaels and Rauch 2013). The specific setting in which we examine this is northwestern Europe, where we trace out the effects of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire more than 1500 years ago, through to the present day.

Around the dawn of the first millennium Rome conquered and subsequently urbanised areas, including those that make up present-day France and Britain (as far north as Hadrian's Wall). Under the Romans, towns in France and Britain developed similarly in terms of their institutions, organisation, and size. Around the middle of the fourth century, however, their fates diverged.

Roman Britain suffered invasions, usurpations, and reprisals against its elite. Around 410CE, when Rome itself was first sacked, Roman Britain's last remaining legions, which had maintained order and security, departed permanently. Consequently, Roman Britain's political, social, and economic order collapsed. From 450-600CE, its towns no longer functioned. The Roman towns in France also suffered when the western Roman Empire fell, but many of them survived and were taken over by the Franks.

• In short, the urban network in Britain effectively ended with the fall of the western Roman Empire; French towns experienced greater continuity.
• The divergent paths of British and French urban networks allow us to study the spatial consequences of the resetting of an urban network, as towns across Western Europe re-emerged and grew during the Middle Ages.

During the High Middle Ages Britain and France were once again ruled by common elite – the Normans – rather than the Romans. Britain and France had access to similar production technologies. Both features help us compare the effect of the collapse of the Roman Empire on the evolution of town locations.

Three possible evolution pathways

Following the asymmetric calamity and subsequent re-emergence of towns, one of three scenarios can be imagined.

• First, if locational fundamentals, such as coastlines, mountains, and rivers, consistently favour a fixed set of locations, then these locations would be home to both surviving and re-emerging towns. In this case, we would observe high persistence of locations from the Roman era onwards in both British and French urban networks.
• Second, if locational fundamentals or their value change over time, and these fundamentals affect productivity more than the concentration of human activity, then both urban networks would similarly shift towards locations with improved fundamentals. In this case we would observe less persistence of locations in both British and French urban networks relative to the Roman era.
• Third, if locational fundamentals or their value change, but these fundamentals affect productivity less than the concentration of human activity, then we should see path-dependence in the location of towns. The British urban network, which was reset, would shift away from Roman era locations towards locations which are more suited to the changing economic conditions. But French cites would tend to remain in their original Roman locations.

Towns in France stayed, towns in Britain shifted

In our empirical analysis we find support for the third scenario, where town locations are path-dependent. Medieval towns in France were much more likely to be located near Roman towns than their British counterparts (Figure 1). These differences in persistence are still visible today: only three of the 20 largest cities in Britain are located near the site of Roman towns, compared to 16 in France. This finding suggests that the British urban network shifted towards newly advantageous locations, while French towns remained in locations, which may have become obsolete.

The shift to water transportation should have shifted cities

But this still leaves the question open – was path dependence consequential or not? In other words, did it matter that French towns remained in Roman-era town locations? To shed light on this question, we note that during the Roman era roads connected major towns, facilitating the movements of the Roman army. During the Middle Ages, however, technical improvements to water transportation (Blair 2007 and Fleming 2010) made coastal access more important. This technological change meant that having coastal access mattered more for medieval towns in Britain and France than for Roman ones.

We find that during the Middle Ages towns in Britain were roughly two and a half times more likely to have coastal access – either directly or via a navigable river – than during the Roman era. In contrast, in France there was little change in the urban network's coastal access over the same period. Moreover, we show that having coastal access was associated with faster town growth from 1200-1700, and that for towns with poor coastal access, access to canals was associated with faster population growth.

Figure 1. Roman towns (dots) and medieval towns (empty circles) in Britain and France

www.voxeu.org

These findings, and the high costs of building and maintaining canals, suggest that access to water transportation was invaluable. The conclusion we draw is that many French towns were stuck in the wrong places for many centuries. They could not take advantage of the new transportation technologies since they had poor coastal access; they were in locations that were designed to fit with the demands of Roman times and not the considerations of the Middle Ages.

Conclusions

Taken together, our findings show that urban networks may reconfigure around locational fundamentals that become more valuable over time. This reconfiguration, however, is not inevitable, and towns may remain trapped in bad locations over many centuries, and even millennia. This spatial misallocation of economic activity has almost certainly induced considerable economic costs.

Our findings suggest lessons for today’s policymakers. The conclusion that cities and towns may be misplaced still matters today, as the world's population becomes ever more concentrated in cities. For example, parts of Africa, including some of its cities, are hampered by poor access to the world's markets due to their landlocked position and poor land-transport infrastructure. And across the world, many cities lie close to areas that are susceptible to flooding, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other natural disasters.

Our paper suggests that path-dependence in city locations can still have important welfare costs today.

References

Blair, John (2007), Waterways and canal-building in medieval England, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.

Fleming, Robin (2010), Britain after Rome: The Fall and Rise, 400–1070, London: Allen Lane.

Michaels, Guy and Ferdinand Rauch (2013) “Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012”, CEPR Discussion Paper 9760.

Michaels, Guy, Ferdinand Rauch, and Stephen J Redding (2012) “Urbanization and Structural Transformation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2): 535-586.

World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs (http://esa.un.org/unup/)

Business Insider

Malabares financieros en la devaluación argentina

La devaluación se acelera e inversores levantan la mano para poder comprar bonos dólar linked

El nuevo equipo económico ve que el billete verde oficial está atrasado y le imprime mayor ritmo a la devaluación. Festejan los que tienen títulos que les pagan lo que sube la divisa más un incremental. La alegría no es compartida desde la vereda de los emisores. Las opciones más buscadas

"Si hay alguien que está festejando el cambio del equipo económico y la asunción de Fábrega al frente del Banco Central, ése es el inversor que compró bonos dólar linked", asegura a este medio un operador bursátil.

No es para menos, ya que desde que se produjo el reemplazo de Mercedes Marcó del Pont, el ritmo de devaluación diario se aceleró a valores antes impensados. 

En efecto, hasta el 15 de noviembre el precio del billete oficial había subido "apenas" ocho centavos en el mes. En la segunda quincenaprácticamente el avance se duplicó, para finalizar en los $6,15. 

Con este repunte, el precio de la divisa oficial registró en noviembre la mayor suba del 2013: un 3,8%. Y si este ritmo se mantuviera constante durante un año, implicaría una devaluación del 63%, casi duplicando la tasa de 38% -de por sí alta- que se venía implementando (ver infografía).

De esta manera, quienes buscaron un refugio para cubrirse ante el riesgo cambiario y recurrieron a invertir en bonos dólar linked han logrado resultados más que interesantes.

Precisamente, la clave de este tipo de bonos pasa por su cláusula de ajuste, que no es otra que la variación del tipo de cambio oficial a la que se suma un incremental.

Claro que la demanda de algunos de estos títulos puede enfrentarse con un mercado secundario con poco volumen, lo que es tenido en cuenta por los inversores a la hora de evaluar su entrada y salida.

"Los títulos dólar linked tuvieron una fuerte suba en los primeros días tras haber asumido elnuevo Gabinete, producto del aumento de la devaluación oficial", afirma Betsy Szewach, economista de Proficio Investment.

La experta agrega que el alza más acelerada del billete verde se observa en la demanda y asegura que, tras la fiebre inicial, "ahora se está viendo un mayor requerimiento de los títulos más cortos y de menos en los largos".

"Esto se debe a que la apuesta de estos bonos, atados al dólar, es la convergencia de labrecha cambiaria. Al aumentar el ritmo de devaluación, ambos tipos de cambio tienden a acercarse más rápido", agrega.

Eduardo Fernández, analista de mercados financieros de Rava Sociedad de Bolsa, sotiene que "losbonos dólar linked gozan de una muy buena receptividad entre aquellos inversores que tienen una expectativa muy fuerte de que el ritmo de devaluación seguirá en niveles altos como los vistos en estos últimos días".

En la misma sintonía, un operador de una importante mesa de dinero señala: "Gran parte de losfondos de inversión sumaron posiciones en estos títulos, ya que el rendimiento es muyatractivo en pesos".

Y agrega: "Mientras las tasas de interés para plazos fijos -mayoristas y minoristas- estén pordebajo del índice inflacionario y el ritmo de devaluación se ubique por encima, esta combinación va a generar mayores atractivos para los bonos dólar linked".

La aparición de este instrumento se remonta al momento en el que se implementara el cepo cambiario (octubre de 2011), cuando los gobiernos provinciales enfrentaron grandes dificultades para hacerse de dólares para cumplir con sus compromisos financieros.

Cabe recordar que sólo existen bonos de este tipo de origen corporativo, provincial o municipal, como por ejemplo los de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Es decir, no hay emisión de papeles nacionales bajo esta modalidad.

La alegría no es para todos
Si se acrecienta el incentivo por el lado de los compradores, desde la vereda de los emisores -que en general son provincias o empresas-, el camino comienza a ser cada vez más sinuoso.

Es que en la medida en que el tipo de cambio avanza a mayor velocidad, también lo hace elmonto de la deuda que deben afrontar.

Cabe recordar que la aparición de los "dólar linked" en el mercado se produjo en un contexto en el que la evolución del tipo de cambio era muy inferior al avance de la inflación, lo cual alentaba a algún tipo de licuación de deuda a lo largo del tiempo.

Pero, en las últimas semanas todo cambió y el sistema de devaluación "lenta" llevado a cabo por el Banco Central pasó a ser parte del pasado.

En buen romance, inicialmente para los emisores eran una muy buena fuente de financiación, pero el incremento devaluatorio comenzó a generarles algunos problemas.

"Con esta mayor tasa, quienes emitieron se encuentran con un encarecimiento de sus compromisos. Ahora les resulta más difícil financiarse y hay riesgos de que algunos no puedan respaldarlas, ya que las provincias no pueden emitir pesos", explica Rubén José Pasquali, analista de mercados de Mayoral.

Ahora hay mucha demanda pero falta más oferta, coinciden en señalar desde la city porteña.

No obstante, sostienen que lo positivo de esta alternativa para las empresas y provincias es que les otorga un mayor plazo de fondeo, que oscila entre 3 y 4 años.

En resumen, les genera un costo mayor que otro tipo de créditos pero logran más plazo y lesimpacta menos en el balance fiscal.

Claro que, a pesar de los inconvenientes mencionados, los mismos son infinitamente menores a que si las provincias o empresas quisiesen financiarse en el exterior, ya que deberían enfrentar un costo crediticio mucho más elevado.

Bonos dólar linked más buscados
El ranking de las preferencias está liderado por los bonos de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires -en sus distintos vencimientos- el de Mendoza -que se extiende hasta el 2016- y las letras garantizadas de Neuquén.

Esto se refleja en el aumento de sus cotizaciones, que para estos títulos se movieron entre el20% y el 33% en apenas cinco meses (ver infografía). 

Los mismos gozan de mayor liquidez y han logrado los mejores rendimientos en el año.

"A la hora de elegir, me inclinaría por los papeles que tienen el menor riesgo posible, como los de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires y provincia de Buenos Aires", añade Horacio Corneille, de la sociedad de bolsa que lleva su nombre.

Cabe señalar que estos bonos garantizan una tasa adicional a la de la devaluación de la divisa estadounidense oficial.

Según los operadores, los de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires tienen una muy buena demanda ya que poseen un respaldo más seguro, mientras que los de la Provincia se destacan por su gran liquidez en la plaza bursátil, por lo que son vistos como una buena opción entre quienes buscan un activo de entrada y salida rápida.

Además de la tasa de devaluación oficial, estos bonos pagan un interés que oscila entre el4% y 7%.

El gran atractivo que obtuvieron estos papeles en el último tiempo trajo aparejado un inconveniente para los que desean sumarse ahora a esta alternativa de inversión: el precio de compra más elevado.

"En la actualidad, ya no están muy baratos porque hay una expectativa en el mercado de que la devaluación oficial seguirá aumentando velozmente. Y esa perspectiva se está reflejando en el precio de estos papeles", señala Pasquali.

Y completa: "De hecho, varios de estos títulos ya están cotizando a $7, cuando el dólar oficial actualmente está en 6,17 pesos".

No obstante, en el caso de que se dé un repunte brusco de la divisa estadounidense, de entre20% a 30%, "sería un muy buen negocio para los que compren ahora".

En cambio, si la devaluación se mantiene en el ritmo constante y acelerado actual, "hay que comprar los de mediano o largo plazo, porque no van a ser tan buen negocio los de corto", finaliza Pasquali.

"Existe una demanda insatisfecha de estos productos, ya que el incentivo para invertir en ellos es muy fuerte", destaca otra de las fuentes consultadas.

Lo que hay que mirar
La gran referencia para quienes invierten en estos títulos es el ritmo de devaluación del tipo de cambio oficial.

En tal sentido, un indicador que permite inferir qué puede ocurrir en los próximos meses es la cotización de los futuros que se operan en el Mercado Rofex de Rosario.

Al respecto, los últimos datos disponibles marcan un tipo de cambio de $6,38 para fin de año y de $8,09 para septiembre de 2014.

Este último precio implica una devaluación anual estimada cercana al 40 por ciento.

De darse un precio de $8,09 para esa fecha, esto se traduciría en un ritmo devaluatorio del 2,7% mensual promedio, de aquí a septiembre del año que viene.

No cabe duda que estas proyecciones suenan como un "canto de sirena" para quienes han venido invirtiendo en bonos dólar linked.

Títulos que ahora, más que nunca, sacan a relucir el atractivo de ofrecer lo que sube el tipo de cambio, con la consiguiente cobertura ante una abrupta devaluación de la moneda nacional.

iProfesional