Por qué fracasan los países: una lección para Argentina
Nicolás Cachanosky | Infobae
En su best-seller Por qué fracasan los países, Daron Acemoglu y James A. Robinson hacen un extenso estudio sobre los descalabros y éxitos de los países a lo largo de la historia. Países exitosos son aquellos que crean riqueza de manera sostenida y estable recudiendo sus niveles de pobreza. Los países que fracasan presentan el caso contrario, no logran crear riqueza de manera estable y tienen serias dificultades para reducir sus niveles de pobreza. Acemoglu y Robinson argumentan que el éxito y el fracaso de los países no se deben ni a cuestiones geográficas como recursos y clima ni a cuestiones culturales, sino que dependen del marco institucional.
Los autores dividen las instituciones en dos grandes grupos. Por un lado, se encuentran las instituciones extractivas, que están destinadas a extraer recursos de la población a beneficio del poder político de turno y sus amigos. Del otro lado se encuentran las instituciones inclusivas, que protegen las libertades y la propiedad de los individuos. Bajo instituciones inclusivas, el poder no se concentra en manos de la dirigencia política y se dan los incentivos para crear y acumular riqueza. Los países que fracasan son aquellos que se encuentran bajo instituciones extractivas, mientras que los países exitosos son aquellos que han logrado imponer instituciones inclusivas. Acemoglu y Robinson respaldan esta conclusión con varios siglos de historia que soporta su tesis.
¿Qué tiene que ver esto con Argentina? Una de las conclusiones de este libro es que el paso de instituciones extractivas a instituciones inclusivas depende de la buena suerte de un accidente histórico o de un héroe. El héroe o estadista es aquel dirigente político capaz de generar un movimiento desde instituciones extractivas hacia instituciones inclusivas. En otras palabras, el héroe no es un gran estratega electoral, el héroe es un gran educador. En este contexto, el antihéroe sería lo contrario, aquel dirigente político que genera un movimiento hacia instituciones extractivas alejándonos de las instituciones inclusivas. En este marco, los Kirchner han sido antihéroes, generaron un gran marco extractivo en beneficio propio y de sus seguidores. El kirchnerismo se ha enriquecido a expensas de dejar niveles de pobreza que evidencian lo extractivo de su proyecto político.
Si asignamos una muy baja (o nula) probabilidad de que partidos políticos históricos como el Partido Justicialista o la Unión Cívica Radical produzcan un héroe, el destino económico y social de Argentina queda entre la buena suerte de un accidente histórico o que Cambiemos posea héroes en sus filas. Da la sensación, sin embargo, que más allá del eslogan de cambio, el gobierno de turno posee más seguidores de encuestas que héroes o estadistas.
Si bien las restricciones políticas y sociales son innegables, año y medio de mandato muestran una semántica o una retórica por parte del PRO y Cambiemos que no están destinadas a generar un fuerte cambio institucional en torno a instituciones inclusivas. La retórica en torno a controles de precios como el programa de Precios Cuidados, el "compre nacional", obligar a supermercados a informar precios en aplicaciones de teléfonos móviles, exigir a empresarios que inviertan (como si pagar la carga tributaria argentina no fuese ponerse el país al hombro), otorgar subsidios a piqueteros que coartan la libre circulación a su gusto, etcétera, habla más de un nacionalismo económico que de una genuina mentalidad de libertades económicas y civiles.
Un gran momento educador hubiese sido explicar en detalle la herencia recibida en lugar de asumir que el ciudadano entiende el desastre económico, social e institucional que dejó el kirchnerismo. Cambiemos ni siquiera posee, o no ha dado a conocer, un plan económico. Tener objetivos no es tener un plan económico que detalle cómo llegar a esos objetivos. ¿Qué estrategia en concreto se conoce más allá de esperar una lluvia de dólares? La situación económica recibida y la actual son insostenibles y no se perciben claros avances para solucionar el gran desequilibrio macroeconómico que es el déficit fiscal.
Cambiemos puede tener convicción de gestión, pero parece faltarle convicción institucional. Esto deja, lamentablemente, a Argentina a la espera de un accidente histórico para finalmente pasar del fracaso al éxito. Quizás tengamos que aceptar que apostar a la buena suerte histórica no es en sí una estrategia de cambio. Argentina necesita más héroes y menos gestores eficientes.
El blog reúne material de noticias de teoría y aplicaciones de conceptos básicos de economía en la vida diaria. Desde lo micro a lo macro pasando por todas las vertientes de los coyuntural a lo más abstracto de la teoría. La ciencia económica es imperial.
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domingo, 23 de abril de 2017
lunes, 9 de diciembre de 2013
Path dependency en las ciudades europeas
Why Many Cities Are Located In The Wrong Place
GUY MICHAELS, FERDINAND RAUCH, VOXEU.ORG
The world is urbanising rapidly (World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision). Some of its rapidly growing cities, however, seem to be misplaced. They are located in places hampered by poor access to world markets, shortages of water, or vulnerability to flooding, earthquakes, and volcanoes.
The world is urbanising rapidly (World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision). Some of its rapidly growing cities, however, seem to be misplaced. They are located in places hampered by poor access to world markets, shortages of water, or vulnerability to flooding, earthquakes, and volcanoes.
This outcome – cities being stuck in the wrong places – has dire economic and social consequences. When thinking about policy responses, a key research question is whether historical events can leave towns trapped in suboptimal places.
New research on a historical ‘experiment’
Our recent research looks at this issue by comparing the evolution of two initially similar urban networks following a historical calamity that wiped out one, while leaving the other largely intact (Michaels and Rauch 2013). The specific setting in which we examine this is northwestern Europe, where we trace out the effects of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire more than 1500 years ago, through to the present day.
Around the dawn of the first millennium Rome conquered and subsequently urbanised areas, including those that make up present-day France and Britain (as far north as Hadrian's Wall). Under the Romans, towns in France and Britain developed similarly in terms of their institutions, organisation, and size. Around the middle of the fourth century, however, their fates diverged.
Roman Britain suffered invasions, usurpations, and reprisals against its elite. Around 410CE, when Rome itself was first sacked, Roman Britain's last remaining legions, which had maintained order and security, departed permanently. Consequently, Roman Britain's political, social, and economic order collapsed. From 450-600CE, its towns no longer functioned. The Roman towns in France also suffered when the western Roman Empire fell, but many of them survived and were taken over by the Franks.
- In short, the urban network in Britain effectively ended with the fall of the western Roman Empire; French towns experienced greater continuity.
- The divergent paths of British and French urban networks allow us to study the spatial consequences of the resetting of an urban network, as towns across Western Europe re-emerged and grew during the Middle Ages.
During the High Middle Ages Britain and France were once again ruled by common elite – the Normans – rather than the Romans. Britain and France had access to similar production technologies. Both features help us compare the effect of the collapse of the Roman Empire on the evolution of town locations.
Three possible evolution pathways
Following the asymmetric calamity and subsequent re-emergence of towns, one of three scenarios can be imagined.
- First, if locational fundamentals, such as coastlines, mountains, and rivers, consistently favour a fixed set of locations, then these locations would be home to both surviving and re-emerging towns. In this case, we would observe high persistence of locations from the Roman era onwards in both British and French urban networks.
- Second, if locational fundamentals or their value change over time, and these fundamentals affect productivity more than the concentration of human activity, then both urban networks would similarly shift towards locations with improved fundamentals. In this case we would observe less persistence of locations in both British and French urban networks relative to the Roman era.
- Third, if locational fundamentals or their value change, but these fundamentals affect productivity less than the concentration of human activity, then we should see path-dependence in the location of towns. The British urban network, which was reset, would shift away from Roman era locations towards locations which are more suited to the changing economic conditions. But French cites would tend to remain in their original Roman locations.
Towns in France stayed, towns in Britain shifted
In our empirical analysis we find support for the third scenario, where town locations are path-dependent. Medieval towns in France were much more likely to be located near Roman towns than their British counterparts (Figure 1). These differences in persistence are still visible today: only three of the 20 largest cities in Britain are located near the site of Roman towns, compared to 16 in France. This finding suggests that the British urban network shifted towards newly advantageous locations, while French towns remained in locations, which may have become obsolete.
The shift to water transportation should have shifted cities
But this still leaves the question open – was path dependence consequential or not? In other words, did it matter that French towns remained in Roman-era town locations? To shed light on this question, we note that during the Roman era roads connected major towns, facilitating the movements of the Roman army. During the Middle Ages, however, technical improvements to water transportation (Blair 2007 and Fleming 2010) made coastal access more important. This technological change meant that having coastal access mattered more for medieval towns in Britain and France than for Roman ones.
We find that during the Middle Ages towns in Britain were roughly two and a half times more likely to have coastal access – either directly or via a navigable river – than during the Roman era. In contrast, in France there was little change in the urban network's coastal access over the same period. Moreover, we show that having coastal access was associated with faster town growth from 1200-1700, and that for towns with poor coastal access, access to canals was associated with faster population growth.
Figure 1. Roman towns (dots) and medieval towns (empty circles) in Britain and France
These findings, and the high costs of building and maintaining canals, suggest that access to water transportation was invaluable. The conclusion we draw is that many French towns were stuck in the wrong places for many centuries. They could not take advantage of the new transportation technologies since they had poor coastal access; they were in locations that were designed to fit with the demands of Roman times and not the considerations of the Middle Ages.
Conclusions
Taken together, our findings show that urban networks may reconfigure around locational fundamentals that become more valuable over time. This reconfiguration, however, is not inevitable, and towns may remain trapped in bad locations over many centuries, and even millennia. This spatial misallocation of economic activity has almost certainly induced considerable economic costs.
Our findings suggest lessons for today’s policymakers. The conclusion that cities and towns may be misplaced still matters today, as the world's population becomes ever more concentrated in cities. For example, parts of Africa, including some of its cities, are hampered by poor access to the world's markets due to their landlocked position and poor land-transport infrastructure. And across the world, many cities lie close to areas that are susceptible to flooding, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other natural disasters.
Our paper suggests that path-dependence in city locations can still have important welfare costs today.
References
Blair, John (2007), Waterways and canal-building in medieval England, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.
Fleming, Robin (2010), Britain after Rome: The Fall and Rise, 400–1070, London: Allen Lane.
Michaels, Guy and Ferdinand Rauch (2013) “Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012”, CEPR Discussion Paper 9760.
Michaels, Guy, Ferdinand Rauch, and Stephen J Redding (2012) “Urbanization and Structural Transformation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2): 535-586.
World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs (http://esa.un.org/unup/)
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