Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta industrialización. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta industrialización. Mostrar todas las entradas

sábado, 12 de septiembre de 2015

Rusia aplica ISI para crecer industrialmente

El complejo industrial de Rusia renace con una receta del pasado
modelo de reconversion tras la quiebra de la urssBajo una corporación estatal, las empresas se modernizan y ganan mercados. Se valora el marketing y buscan inversores extranjeros.


Turbinas. La producción de aeronaves para uso civil y militar constituye uno de los pilares de la renovada industria rusa.

iECO

Tras varios años de ajuste, modernización de los procesos de producción y adecuación de las normas para competir en la globalización, la reconversión del sector industrial en Rusia comienza a mostrar resultados positivos y traza proyectos ambiciosos. El resurgir industrial ruso está basado en un modelo de conducción centralizada en Rostec, una gigantesca corporación estatal inclinada especialmente a la producción y venta de armamento y material bélico.

Una conclusión prejuiciosa y apresurada diría que Rostec, que hoy agrupa a 663 empresas mayoritariamente estatales y 475.000 empleados, es un retorno a la tradición industrial soviética, casi de inspiración kafkiana. Nada es lo que parece. Con una fórmula mixta entre la doctrina de mercado y una planificación piramidal, Rostec desarrolla, fabrica y distribuye productos con alto contenido tecnológico y valor agregado, un menú que abarca autos, aviones, motores, helicópteros, aparatos médicos de vanguardia, maquinaria, biotecnologías industriales, radioelectrónica y sobre todo armas, misiles, vehículos, cazas y helicópteros artillados, entre muchas otras cosas.

Rostec es el resultado de la crisis industrial post-comunista. Creada en 2007 como un plan de salvataje al complejo industrial y de defensa que no pudo adaptarse a la “economía de mercado”, la corporación exhibe resultados alentadores. Con US$13.200 millones de facturación, Rusia logró recuperar en 2014 el segundo lugar en el ranking de países exportadores de productos militares. Pero además, el consorcio estatal descubrió el valor del marketing, maneja marcas célebres e instaladas, como Lada, Kalashnikov, Helicópteros de Rusia, Tupolev y Kamaz (camiones), trata de posicionar nuevas, incluyendo Rostec, y hasta busca socios y aliados inversores para modernizar sus procesos comerciales.

“Logramos figurar en el top ten de las compañías más grandes del mundo. Y tenemos previsto alcanzar en 2035 el 5° lugar, y estoy seguro de que lo podemos hacer”, señaló Vasily Brovko, jefe de Comunicaciones Globales de Rostec. Entre otros planes, la corporación intenta profundizar lazos con Latinoamérica (la región representa el 15% de sus exportaciones) y, además, ingresar en nuevos segmentos como el de los celulares, con su modelo estrella: el Yotaphone, dotado de una curiosa doble pantalla. “Sabemos que es un mercado muy competitivo. Y le apuntamos principalmente a China, un mercado que consume el 50% de la producción mundial”, añadió Brovko.

La reconfiguración en una megacorporación estatal proviene del fracaso de la apertura económica tras la quiebra del URSS. Por un decreto del presidente de la Federación de Rusia, Vladimir Putin, Rostec pasa a controlar 426 empresas del sector industrial considerado estratégico. Según el último balance presentado por la corporación, la mayoría de los activos transferidos estaban en estado de coma: 148 empresas estaban en proceso de crisis; 28 en bancarrota; 17 no realizaban ninguna actividad; y otras 27 habían perdido gran parte de su patrimonio. Y las deudas asfixiaban. “Las cadenas de producción sufrían estragos, los fondos estaban agotados y las empresas necesitaban urgentemente una gestión más eficaz”, dice el informe.

Al frente de la corporación quedó Serguei Chémezov, un ex alto oficial del Ejército rojo y un hombre de extrema confianza de Putin. Al asumir, Chémezov trazó la estrategia de promover el desarrollo de la industria rusa, incluido el complejo militar, modernizando al entramado empresarial, atrayendo “tanto a las inversiones rusas como extranjeras”.

Más que cuestiones ideológicas, en este enorme conglomerado estatal convergen prácticas culturales rusas de todos los tiempos: zarista, comunista y del capitalismo global y moderno. Desde la centenaria fábrica de motores Klimov (destinados a toda clase de vehículos y aeronaves) recuerdan que su origen se debe a un decreto firmado en 1914 por el zar Nicolás II, “nuestro monarca”. Ubicada en la orgullosa San Petersburgo, Klimov atravesó numerosas reconversiones hasta hoy, que se dedica a producir turbinas, compresores, motores para aviones y helicópteros.

La compañía integra uno de los 15 holdings verticales de Rostec, y expresa las prácticas industriales y empresariales de la Rusia actual. Con una plantilla de 1.900 trabajadores, la empresa atrae ingenieros y técnicos provenientes de las escuelas técnicas y universidades de Ingeniería cercanas a la ciudad. En Klimov explican que firmaron algunos acuerdos con facultades e institutos politécnicos para crear cátedras y materias específicas de su negocio. Si bien el salario promedio no parece alto (50.000 rublos, es decir, unos US$750), en la empresa aseguran que son los más altos de la industria, y que “el 90% del personal es fiel y son leales a los objetivos de la empresa”.

En el imaginario de los jóvenes, el factor económico, los ingresos, no es la única motivación para permanecer y trabajar en su país. Especialmente en las profesiones y carreras vinculadas a la producción (desde las ciencias duras, ingenierías, metalurgia, electrónica y química, entre otras) tan buscadas y muy bien remuneradas en todo el mundo. “La aviación es muy interesante para los jóvenes. Estamos de moda”, detalló un ejecutivo del área de reclutamiento de Klimov.

A 700 kilómetros al Este de Moscú, en Kazan, está instalada la planta principal de Kazan Helicópteros. Con 75 años de historia, 7.000 empleados, la compañía rivaliza con la norteamericana Bell. Tiene clientes en 80 países, entre ellos la Argentina, facturó US$1.500 millones el año pasado, lo cual le permite posicionarse en un lugar preponderante en la estructura de Rostec.

El complejo industrial ruso revive con una receta aparentemente conocida. El objetivo proclamado es la autosuficiencia: no depender de insumos importados. Las propias compañías de Rostec se complementan, a contramano de la globalización de la producción.

domingo, 2 de agosto de 2015

Alto endeudamiento impulsó la (revolución de la) industrialización

Milagro de la deuda: ¿Por qué el país que tomaron más préstamos se industrializaron primero?

Jaume Ventura, Hans-Joachim Voth - VOX CEPR's Policy Portal

¿Es la deuda realmente tan malo? Esta columna se ve en las deudas altísimas, subidas de impuestos rápido y constante estado de guerra que llevó a la Revolución Industrial en Gran Bretaña, lo que demuestra que el diablo está en los detalles al evaluar la deuda soberana. Cuando consideramos los peligros de la deuda en el mundo actual, hay que mantener un ojo en sus beneficios potenciales.

Deudas altísimas, el rápido aumento de los impuestos, guerras constantes y costosas, una carga de la deuda que supera el 200% del PIB. ¿Cuáles son las posibilidades de que un país con tales características podría crecer rápidamente? Casi cualquier persona probablemente diría 'ninguna'.

Y, sin embargo, estos son exactamente las condiciones en que la Revolución Industrial tuvo lugar en Gran Bretaña. La deuda del gobierno de Gran Bretaña pasó de 5% del PIB en 1700 a más del 200% en 1820, se enfrentaron en una guerra en un año de cada tres (la mayoría de ellos por poco o ningún beneficio económico), y los impuestos aumentaron rápidamente, pero no lo suficiente como para mantener el ritmo con el aumento del gasto.

La Figura 1 muestra cómo la guerra impulsó el gasto y condujo a la acumulación de deuda masiva - las zonas grises sombreadas indican las guerras, y que son responsables de casi la totalidad del aumento de la deuda. Durante el mismo período, Gran Bretaña se trasladó gran parte de su población fuera de la agricultura y en la industria y servicios - fuera del campo y en las ciudades. La población creció rápidamente, y la producción industrial aumentó (Crafts 1985). Como resultado, Gran Bretaña se convirtió en el primer país en liberarse de las cadenas del régimen de Malthus.

Figura 1. acumulación de la deuda y el gasto público en el Reino Unido, 1690-1860



Hasta ahora, los investigadores pensaron que la mayoría de los efectos del endeudamiento público en el crecimiento, ya sea neutral o negativa. Un punto de vista prominente sostuvo que la inversión en la industria privada habría sido mayor tenía Bretaña luchó y prestado menos (Williamson 1984). Otro argumento es que las decisiones de ahorro privadas deshicieron los efectos potencialmente negativos de endeudamiento masivo - porque la deuda tiene finalmente que ser reembolsados, los agentes privados esperado aumento de los impuestos en el futuro y neutralizado los efectos de la acumulación de deuda (Barro, 1990).

La revolución que no fue

En un artículo reciente, sostenemos que el endeudamiento excesivo de alcohol de Gran Bretaña era en realidad bueno para el crecimiento (Ventura y Voth 2015). Para entender por qué la acumulación de deuda masiva puede haber acelerado la Revolución Industrial, consideramos en primer lugar lo que debería haber sucedido en una economía donde los empresarios de repente empiezan a explotar una nueva tecnología con altos rendimientos. Por lo general, esperaríamos capital para perseguir estas oportunidades de inversión - cualquier persona con dinero debería haber tratado de poner sus ahorros en nuevas fábricas de algodón, fundiciones de hierro y fabricantes de cerámica. Cuando no tenían la experiencia necesaria para invertir directamente, los bancos y las sociedades por acciones deberían haber reciclado fondos para un ahorro directo a donde regresa en donde más alto.

Esto no es lo que pasó. Intermediación financiera era lamentablemente inadecuada - que no pudo enviar el dinero donde debería haber ido. Como un historiador prominente de la Revolución Industrial británica argumentado:

"Los depósitos de ahorro eran lo suficientemente completo, pero conductos para conectar con las ruedas de la industria eran pocos y escasos ... sorprendentemente poco de la riqueza [británico] encontró su camino en las nuevas empresas industriales ...." (Postan 1935).

Había muchas razones para esto, pero la represión financiera deliberada por parte del gobierno era una de ellas. Límites de usura, la Ley de la burbuja, la norma de los seis socios que limita el tamaño de los bancos - todos ellos fueron diseñados para sofocar la intermediación privada, en parte, a fin de facilitar el acceso a los fondos para el gobierno (Temin y Voth 2013).

Sin intermediación efectiva, nuevos sectores tuvieron que autofinanciar - tasas de retorno se quedaron alto porque tan poco capital fresco entró a perseguir los rendimientos altísimos. Allen calcula que la tasa de ganancia para el capital aumentó del 10% en la década de 1770 a más del 20% en la década de 1830 - la parte del capital de la renta nacional en más del doble (Allen 2009).

¿Por qué la deuda ayudó?

La ineficiencia de la intermediación privada es crucial para la deuda a jugar un papel beneficioso. Mediante la emisión de bonos a gran escala, el gobierno promovió eficazmente una manera - sin querer - a poner dinero en los bolsillos de los empresarios en los nuevos sectores.

¿Cómo se hace eso? Antes de la disponibilidad de la deuda pública, la Gran Bretaña de los ricos y poderosos - la nobleza - mayoritariamente invertido en mejoras de la tierra y de la tierra. Estado estaba estrechamente ligada a la tierra, pero la mejora no era una empresa rentable. Muchas formas de inversión generaron un retorno del 2% de menos. No es de extrañar que los nobles estaban desencantados con la inversión aterrizado: Por la década de 1750, los primeros nobles fueron cambiando de forma masiva fuera de la tierra y en la deuda del gobierno. El Primer Ministro Sir Robert Peel aconsejó: "cada propietario debe tener la mayor cantidad de utilería (como su finca) en consols u otros valores ..." (Habacuc 1994). Muchos nobles obligados, cambiando en un activo con un perfil de riesgo-rendimiento superiores. Como Lord Monson expresó así: "Lo que un agujero infernal es propiedad de la tierra. Ningún ingreso determinado puede ser contada sobre. Espero que su futura esposa tendrá consols. . . "(Thompson 1963).

El cambio de la inversión en el encalado, Marling, drenaje, y el recinto en deuda recursos liberados del gobierno - laboral que ya no podía ser empleada de manera rentable en el campo tuvieron que buscar empleo en otros lugares. Debido a que gran parte de la mano de obra agrícola Inglés fueron provistos por trabajadores asalariados, el cambio a la deuda del gobierno empujó los trabajadores de la tierra. Como era de esperar, los salarios no lograron mantener el ritmo de la producción; los salarios reales, ajustados por incomodidades urbanas, probablemente cayeron en el período 1750-1830. Lo que hizo la vida imposible a los trabajadores, tal como se describe con elocuencia por Engels entre otros, fue una bendición para los capitalistas. Sus tasas de ganancia siguieron aumentando como capital recibió una parte cada vez mayor del pastel - mientras que la proporción del ingreso nacional que va a la mano de obra y la tierra contratada. Mayores ganancias escriben de forma más inversión en nuevas industrias, y el crecimiento industrial de Gran Bretaña se aceleró.

Al poner la deuda en el centro de nuestra interpretación de la Revolución Industrial, podemos ofrecer una explicación unificada para una serie de características que hasta ahora han parecido desconcertante. El crecimiento fue relativamente lento, sobre todo en el principio (Crafts 1985) -, pero el cambio tecnológico fue probablemente bastante rápida (Temin 1997). Endeudamiento Gobierno redujo la formación de capital en el impacto - pero el cambio estructural fue rápida durante el período en su conjunto. Las tasas de retorno eran altas en la industria, pero poco capital persiguieron estos retornos. Los salarios no pudieron seguir el ritmo de la productividad a pesar del rápido movimiento fuera del campo y en las ciudades. Al hacer hincapié en la forma en la emisión de deuda pública 'curó' las consecuencias negativas de las fricciones financieras, podemos explicar conjuntamente rápido cambio estructural y el crecimiento lento; los rápidos cambios tecnológicos y pobres crecimiento de los salarios; el endeudamiento público masivo y el primer despegue en un crecimiento sostenido.

Adiós al centro

La emisión de deuda pública también se aceleró el cambio social - el aumento de los capitalistas y la decadencia de la nobleza. Sin ella, las tasas de ganancia en la industria habría sido menos, y la decadencia y caída de la nobleza como una fuerza económica dominante habrían tomado mucho más tiempo.

La solución que han asegurado el crecimiento más rápido - un mejor sistema financiero - habría conservado jerarquía social de Inglaterra por completo. La inversión financiera de la nobleza habría fluido en nuevos sectores a través de los bancos y el mercado de valores, lo que permite el 1% para ganar altos rendimientos. El aumento de los capitalistas se habría demorado largo o evitado por completo.

El cuadro más grande

¿Cuánto de la situación en la industrialización de Inglaterra tiene alguna relevancia para el mundo tal como es ahora? ¿Es esta una historia de una isla lejana y el período de las cuales sabemos muy poco - parafraseando a Chamberlain - o se mantenga lecciones para el presente? Fricciones financieras son todavía muy prominente, incluso en los países más desarrollados de hoy; el cambio de la rentabilidad de los sectores revolucionarios debería tener efectos de primer orden sobre la tasa de largo plazo de crecimiento. La emisión de deuda pública aún puede desplazar la inversión, es decir, en general, ineficiente.

Estos efectos que mejoran la eficiencia de la deuda pública puede ser aún más importante en los países en desarrollo. Allí, los beneficios adicionales de la deuda que no discutimos - tales como proporcionar un refugio seguro de valor, y una cierta fuente de liquidez (Holmstrom y Tirole, 1998) - pueden inclinar el acta general aún más a favor del endeudamiento público. Nada de esto quiere decir que las deudas no pueden llegar a ser excesiva (Reinhart y Rogoff 2009) -, pero si tenemos en cuenta los peligros de la deuda, hay que mantener un ojo en sus beneficios potenciales.


Referencias

Allen, R (2009), “Engel’s pause: A pessimist’s guide to the British Industrial Revolution”, Explorations in Economic History 46 (2): 418–35.

Barro, R J (1987), “Government spending, interest rates, prices, and budget deficits in the United Kingdom, 1701–1918”, Journal of Monetary Economics 20 (2): 221–47.

Crafts, N F R (1985), British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Habakkuk, H J (1994), Marriage, Debt, and the Estates System: English Landownership, 1650-1950, Clarendon Press.

Holmstrom, B R, and J Tirole (1998), “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy 106(1): 1-40.

Postan, M M (1935), “Recent trends in the accumulation of capital”, The Economic History Review 6 (1): 1–12.

Temin, P (1997), "Two views of the British industrial revolution", The Journal of Economic History 57(1): 63-82.

Temin, P and H-J Voth (2013), Prometheus Shackled: Goldsmith Banks and England’s Financial Revolution After 1700, Oxford University Press.

Thompson, F M L (1963), “English landed society in the nineteenth century”, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century.

Reinhart, C M, and K Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different, Princeton University Press.

Williamson, J G (1984), "Why was British growth so slow during the industrial revolution?" The Journal of Economic History 44(3): 687-712.

Ventura, J and H-J Voth (2015), “Debt into growth: How government borrowing accelerated the Industrial Revolution”, CEPR DP No. 10652.

viernes, 20 de diciembre de 2013

El futuro desempleo estructural estadounidense

10 American Industries That Will Be Destroyed In The Next Decade
ALISON GRISWOLD

tailor garment worker
Dan Kitwood/Getty Images
The clock is ticking on several industries that have long been staples of the American economy.
A new report from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics highlights the industries that are expected to decline the most over the next 10 years. In one of the fields, the BLS forecasts that the workforce will shrink by more than 50% between 2012 and 2022.
Manufacturers of all types will take the brunt of the hit. Industries that produce everything from computer equipment to leather products are expected to bleed positions in the coming years.
It seems that most "made in America" products will soon be relics of the past.

10. Miscellaneous manufacturing

10. Miscellaneous manufacturing
Bill Pugliano/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 268,400
Number projected in 2022: 211,100
Percent decline: 21.3%
Why: The recent recession put a ton of pressure on this industry, which manufactures products such as artificial flowers, mirrors, umbrellas, and fly swatters. These items mostly fall into consumer discretionary spending, which sank during the recession and remains low as the recovery inches along.

9. Textile mills and textile product mills

9. Textile mills and textile product mills
Feng Li/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 234,600
Number projected in 2022: 183,100
Percent decline: 21.8%
Why: U.S. textile mills began to close decades ago, and that trend hasn't reversed. It's much cheaper for companies to outsource textile production to other countries than to pay employees at home.

8. Hardware manufacturing

8. Hardware manufacturing
Lisa Maree Williams/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 25,000
Number projected in 2022: 19,400
Percent decline: 22.4%
Why: Hardware products are typically used in the manufacturing of other items like cars and furniture. Demand for those products collapsed during the recession, and the hardware industry still hasn't recovered, especially with an influx of competitively priced imports.

7. Newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishers

7. Newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishers
Justin Sullivan/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 451,800
Number projected in 2022: 346,800
Percent decline: 23.2%
Why: E-books, smartphones, tablets, computers, and the Internet are destroying print media. Publishers and editors alike are trying to figure out how to get consumers to pay for content they can find for free online.

6. Spring and wire product manufacturing

6. Spring and wire product manufacturing
Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 41,600
Number projected in 2022: 31,300
Percent decline: 24.8%
Why: This industry was another one that suffered in the recession. Factories closed and jobs were slashed or moved to cheaper facilities abroad. Plunging domestic auto manufacturing and homebuilding didn't help, either, as overall market demand sank.

5. Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing

5. Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing
Ian Waldie/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 158,600
Number projected in 2022: 118,700
Percent decline: 25.2%
Why: Like so many other manufacturing sectors, companies in this industry continue to move jobs and plants overseas. High-end products are still made in the U.S., but the bulk of cheap and mass-produced items have moved away from home.

4. Postal Service

4. Postal Service
REUTERS/Mike Blake
Number employed in 2012: 611,200
Number projected in 2022: 442,100
Percent decline: 27.7%
Why: The Postal Service has struggled ever since email caught on. The USPS is hoping that cost-cutting measures and growth in e-commerce deliveries will bolster its revenues, but that largely remains to be seen.

3. Communications equipment manufacturing

3. Communications equipment manufacturing
China Photos/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 109,500
Number projected in 2022: 78,600
Percent decline: 28.2%
Why: Product innovation and design still takes place in the U.S., but the actual production of this equipment (TVs, radios, cell phones, etc.) is typically outsourced to countries with lower wages such as Mexico and China.

2. Leather and allied product manufacturing

2. Leather and allied product manufacturing
Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 29,400
Number projected in 2022: 18,500
Percent decline: 37.1%
Why: Most of the world's consumers of leather and hides are located overseas, which makes for an extremely weak domestic market. U.S. tanners and leather makers depend on the ability to export their products and the trade agreements governing the practice.

1. Apparel manufacturing

1. Apparel manufacturing
Michael Loccisano/Getty Images
Number employed in 2012: 148,100
Number projected in 2022: 62,300
Percent decline: 57.9%
Why: Last time you checked the label, how many of your clothes were made in the U.S.? Similar to textile production, most of apparel manufacturing now takes place overseas. That helps companies cut costs and keep garments cheap for consumers.


Business Insider

domingo, 17 de noviembre de 2013

La contaminación viene con la industrialización en China

8 Appalling Instagram Photos Of The Chinese City That Was Shut Down By Smog
Adam Tayor

One of the big stories out of China today is the smog disaster in Harbin, the capital of northeastern Heilongjiang province, home to around 11 million people.

According to Reuters, an index measuring PM2.5, or particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5), reached a reading of 1,000 in some parts of Harbin. More than 300 is considered "hazardous," and the city has been forced to shut down schools, airports and buses because of the air.

One way to check out the daily life of people living in Harbin is through the Instagram tag "Harbin," which shows images and videos of life in a city shut down by smog.

Here's a small selection:
While Weibo may be a more popular sharing tool in China, Instagram is gaining popularity in the country, despite the fact that its parent company, Facebook, is blocked.

Business Insider

miércoles, 6 de noviembre de 2013

Aniversario de la producción en serie de Ford


Se cumple un siglo de Fordismo

Ford Motor Company celebra los 100 años de la línea de montaje, que inauguró una nueva forma de producción industrial en todo el mundo.
Por Gaston Leturia





Ford Motor Company celebra los cien años de la línea de montaje, el sistema de ensamblado introducido por Henry Ford que revolucionó la industria a nivel mundial. Introducida un 7 de octubre de 1913 en la planta de Highland Park, dio origen al proceso de producción en serie caracterizado por una notable reducción en el tiempo y los recursos empleados.

Cuando Henry Ford comenzó a fabricar automóviles a comienzos del siglo XX, la tecnología de vanguardia de la época estaba representada por carros tirados a caballo que trasladaban las carrocerías mientras que los equipos de producción realizaban el ensamblado sobre caballetes y rotaban de una estación a otra. Si bien la entrega de piezas estaba cronometrada, había demoras y el proceso era ineficiente.

Rodeándose de expertos de diversos campos, la visión y el liderazgo de Henry Ford le permitieron crear las condiciones necesarias para que su equipo lleve adelante las innovaciones requeridas en la planta de producción que condujeron a la incorporación de la línea de montaje móvil.

Los ingenieros construyeron el sistema a lo largo de un espacio abierto en la planta donde ubicaron un torno y una cuerda tendida sobre el suelo. Durante la jornada, 140 ensambladores se posicionaron a lo largo de una línea de 150 metros para instalar las piezas en el chasis que fue movilizado por el suelo usando el torno.

Las horas-hombre que demandaba la producción de cada vehículo se redujeron en más de una docena, requiriendo menos de 3 horas-hombre para finalizar cada unidad. La primera optimización en el proceso productivo ocurrió en enero de 1914 cuando la cuerda fue sustituida por una cadena que aportaba mayor seguridad.

Los resultados de la producción en masa fueron inmediatos y significativos. En 1912 Ford Motor Company produjo 82.388 unidades del Modelo T cuyo precio de venta era de US$ 600. En 1916, la producción del modelo T se elevó a 585.388, en tanto que su precio cayó a US$ 360.

El Fordismo nació en la fábrica de Henry Ford y se extendió a otras industrias en todo el mundo. Al poco tiempo de su adopción, las pequeñas empresas de automóviles que producían sólo unos pocos cientos de unidades al año ya trataban de instalar líneas de montajes móviles para optimizar sus procesos de fabricación.

Siguiendo la visión innovadora de su fundador, Ford Motor Company ha sabido mantener vigente el espíritu emprendedor que inspiró a Henry Ford a transformar la industria para producir vehículos accesibles que inauguraron un nuevo estándar en cada uno de sus segmentos.





deautos.com

martes, 13 de agosto de 2013

Un legado olvidado de Ford: el salario alto

On Henry Ford's 150th Birthday, His Greatest Insight Has Been Tragically Forgotten


Henry Ford, who was born 150 years ago today, is remembered as the guy who unleashed the full potential of the assembly line, beginning in 1913 when the Ford Motor Company cranked out Model T's much faster and cheaper than anyone could imagine.
But his business philosophy, known as Fordism, went beyond the implementation of mass production.
Ford argued that high wages were essential for economic and moral reasons. As he wrote in his autobiography:
What good is industry if it be so unskillfully managed as not to return a living to everyone concerned? No question is more important than that of wages — most of the people of the country live on wages. The scale of their living — the rate of their wages — determines the prosperity of the country.
Ford set a powerful precedent in 1914 when he doubled wages for workers on his assembly line in Detroit, Mich. The move was in part a reaction to high turnover among his workers, who found the work too hard and unrewarding. At the same time, he argued that it was good for his business. 
High wages support a good market:
If we can distribute high wages, then that money is going to be spent and it will serve to make storekeepers and distributors and manufacturers and workers in other lines more prosperous and their prosperity will be reflected in our sales. Country-wide high wages spell country-wide prosperity, provided, however, the higher wages are paid for higher production.
High wages lead to good products:
The kind of workman who gives the business the best that is in him is the best kind of workman a business can have. ...[I]f a man feels that his day's work is not only supplying his basic need, but is also giving him a margin of comfort and enabling him to give his boys and girls their opportunity and his wife some pleasure in life, then his job looks good to him and he is free to give it of his best. This is a good thing for him and a good thing for the business.
Whatever the reason, Ford's higher wages were successful. Applications to work at the Dearborn, Mich. factory soared and turnover plummeted.
Ford's advanced production methods were so effective that other automakers and companies in every industry followed suit. Fordism, "the eponymous manufacturing system designed to spew out standardized, low-cost goods and afford its workers decent enough wages to buy them," spread rapidly around the world.
It was good for the workers too. The average Ford worker in 1914 had savings of $207.10; workers who stayed at the factory for the next five years would amass $2,171.14 in savings on average, according to author Richard Snow. Sure enough, they were entering the middle class.
Ford imagined a bright future in which wages would keep on rising:
What do we mean by high wages, anyway? We mean a higher wage than was paid ten months or ten years ago. We do not mean a higher wage than ought to be paid. Our high wages of to-day may be low wages ten years from now. If it is right for the manager of a business to try to make it pay larger dividends, it is quite as right that he should try to make it pay higher wages.
So what happened?
As smart as Ford was, his vision of capitalism would become dated by the 1970s. As described by Walter Russell Mead in "The Decline of Fordism and the Challenge to American Power":
The trouble is that capitalism did not stop with Henry Ford and the system named for him. The era of regulation, income equality, state planning and stability has gradually been yielding to a new form of capitalism over the last generation.
Many writers have worked to describe the difference between Fordism and what we might as well call “millennial capitalism,” the new system we seem to be inventing and exploring. For some, the shift from Fordism to millennialism is a rake’s progress: the end of a system that produced peace, justice, mass prosperity and social security and the rise of a grotesque new system of inequality, instability and bare-knuckled competition in a hideous, neoliberal dog-eat-dog world. For others, the shift represents the glorious triumph of technology and entrepreneurial spirit over a decadent and stagnant era, and the new and more dynamic capitalism offers opportunities to eliminate poverty and transform the human condition.
No aspect of Fordism became more passé than his ideas about high wages. While liberal economists like Robert Reich still argue about the economic benefits of greater income equality, corporations have realized that they can get away with paying relatively less and less.
For a visualization of what has happened on this front in the past half century, check out a graph of corporate profits relative to GDP versus employee compensation relative to GDP:
While corporate profits relative to GDP are soaring, employee compensation relative to GDP has steadily decline.
And it's not just a case of rising tides: median U.S. income in 2012 fell to levels not seen since 1995
This chart doesn't even include the vastly lower wages received by a growing population of foreign laborers who work indirectly for U.S. corporations. Just look at how bad conditions are for garment workers in Bangladesh or tech workers in China.


Business Insider 




miércoles, 10 de julio de 2013

La nueva industrialización de Gran Bretaña empieza en Sheffield

The New Industrial Revolution

by Peter Marsh - Global Minds JUNE 28, 2013

The world is on the cusp of another industrial revolution. New technologies allied with fresh thinking, increased customization and the leveraging of global networks connecting knowledge and materials are transforming traditional industries. In Sheffield - a center of past industrial glories - this latest evolution suggests a new role for the manufacturing sector in high-cost nations that have seen such business move offshore.  
In a small factory in the British city of Sheffield, Brian Reece is buzzing with energy. A spare, intense 61 year-old with a background in tool making, Reece started Sheffield Precision Medical three years ago by acquiring an existing company making orthopedic implants. After spending £1.5m on new machines tools, he has pushed up the annual sales of his business threefold to £2.5m last year, in the process increasing employment from 13 to 30.
With the company’s products including highly accurate pieces of titanium and other metals used in artificial joints including hip replacements, Reece is preoccupied in installing a series of “web-cameras” inside the company’s workshops. “It’s so we can show our customers – which could be large medical device manufacturers anywhere in the world – precisely what we are doing at any time of the day and without them leaving their own headquarters,” he explains. Reece describes his company – with its roots in Sheffield’s long history of metalworking – as a “resurgent remnant.” He adds, “we are taking an age-old technology [metal-cutting] and refreshing it with modern ideas.”
Sheffield is one of the best places in the world to get a sense of how new thinking allied with clever technology and global marketing can transform traditional industries. I was in Sheffield to talk to Reece – and a number of other leading industrialists – in a visit geared partly to promoting my book The New Industrial Revolution, an account of the past, present and future for manufacturing that paints a fairly bright picture for this part of the global economy over the next 50 years. 
In my book, I set out my case for the world moving through a new industrial revolution – the fifth such period of change to alter the field of manufacturing. I suggest this revolution will have a profound affect on boosting the capabilities of manufacturing businesses all around the world, but with a special impact in the high cost nations that have been somewhat disadvantaged in production industries over the past 15 years. The first industrial revolution took place over about 80 years from 1780, and involved a combination of technical changes in fields such as textile engineering, metallurgy and power systems (chiefly new steam engines) to deliver a competitive boost mainly in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, infiltrating the United States later.
The second industrial revolution took place between 1850 and 1900. It was brought about by a set of technology changes involving communications systems such as the railway, iron or steel hulled steamship and telegraph. The third industrial revolution occurred between 1870 and 1930. It was triggered by the stimulus of a number of new industries made possible by key science based discoveries, including ways to make metals such as steel and aluminum and other products (including pharmaceuticals) cheaply and in high volumes, with the new era greatly helped by the then-novelty of low cost and readily available electricity.   
The fourth industrial revolution took place over half a century from 1950 and was based on the powerful impetus that cheap electronic computer processing provided to a huge part of the global economy, including manufacturing. The new industrial revolution started around 2005, and will probably last for about 50 years. It is characterized by seven principal themes.
These include: the intertwining and blending of a great many new and different technologies, taking in disciplines such as novel materials, automation and bio processing; the increasing separation of industry into pockets of specialty or niche activities; the growing importance of making products not on a mass scale but in a customized or personalized manner, where the characteristics of the item are suited to just a small number of users, or even a single person or organization; the evolving role of complex intellectual or material networks linking the world either with new thinking and ideas, or proving a conduit for the transfer of products and materials; the growth in importance of what might seem to embody the antithesis of the last feature but which is in fact complementary, and which concerns the effect of small concentrations of businesses and other organizations in specific geographic areas and which help each other to achieve greater global impact through cluster effects; the way in which China's recent and rapid re-emergence as a world economic superpower has not only helped companies and other groups inside this country but has also benefited other organizations around the world; and finally, the way manufacturers are using the power of their products (or the way the products are made) as a means to help the world to lessen the negative impact of other parts of human activity on the environment.  
Sheffield – Britain’s fifth largest urban center by population – was known for decades as “steel city.” Iron-making has been important in the area since medieval times. In the 19th century, Sheffield became one of the cradles of the first industrial revolution – the set of changes in factory organisation and technology that radically altered life in Europe and the United States by boosting manufacturing productivity and increasing wealth. Probably the most famous episode in Sheffield’s history came in 1859.
Henry Bessemer, the prolific English inventor, chose the city as the place for the first of his ‘Bessemer converters’ – a system for making steel that cut enormously its price by increasing the metal’s rate of production and reducing the need for labor. It was in Sheffield where cheap steel – a commodity that has driven the global economy for the past 150 years – was made for the first time. 
In the days when I was visiting, a resplendent mural was being unveiled in the city center to depict another of Sheffield’s favorite sons – Harry Brearley, a metallurgist who grew up and worked in the city and is credited with having discovered how to make stainless (or “rust-less”) steel 100 years ago. Later in the 20th century, Sheffield stainless steel became famous the world over, in applications such as cutlery and surgical instruments. 
Today, Sheffield is still a place where – unlike in most other large British cities – manufacturing remains a highly visible part of everyday life. Outside the city center, factories remain well in evidence, even if many look rather shabby and have far smaller workforces than 50 years ago. The urban area, taking in the adjacent city of Rotherham, remains home to about 500 metals and engineering businesses, most of them with fewer than 100 employees, and many having connections to the area’s long production traditions.
Take London & Scandinavian Metallurgical (LSM), a maker of specialist metal alloys set up in 1938 in the Sheffield area by a trio of German engineers fleeing the Nazi regime. The company’s managing director is an outgoing Brazilian businessman Itamar Resende whose motto is “where others conform, we innovate.” The business is also highly international, with 87 percent of its £220m sales last year exported. By focusing on highly engineered forms of alloy with applications in sectors such as aerospace, automotive and machine tools, the privately owned company has doubled its revenues over the past seven years.
David Beare, LSM’s Corporate Director, told me “we have to keep finding new ways to use our metals, then we feel we are in with a chance.” The company has, for instance, been expanding recently in areas such as making new additive materials for use in tin-foil in the packaging industry, and in the field of high-power magnets.
Among other Sheffield companies, many have followed a similar path, avoiding commodity areas of industry and focusing on niche areas of production with fairly small numbers of competitors and where sales are made on the basis of original ideas and performance, rather than price. Another example is Gripple, a producer of specialist connectors for use in factory applications and fencing, which work by ‘gripping’ pieces of wire in unusual ways. Gripple was started in 1989 by Hugh Facey, a larger than life former wire salesman who remains in charge of the business as Chairman.
Facey has based his business philosophy on continually finding new forms of connection through encouraging experimentation. Nowadays the key work in this area is done in a 12-person “innovation centre” at his company’s headquarters. Referred to as “the madhouse” by Facey, the interior of the innovation centre is  painted bright orange, with a key feature being a big red button displayed prominently on one of the walls. "When the people here come up with a particularly good idea they press the button,” confides Facey. He likes to surprise visitors by trying it out, triggering a loud screeching sound.
But for all the go-ahead demeanor of people such as Facey, it would be wrong to depict the city as without economic problems. Manufacturing in Sheffield has faced challenges, as indeed has the same branch of industry in much of the rest of the United Kingdom and further afield. The share of manufacturing in the GDP last year was only about 11 percent, down from almost 30 percent in 1970. Over this period the number of workers in manufacturing has fallen by about 5 million, to a little more than 2 million. 
With manufacturing historically having represented a larger share of the local economy than in other parts of the country, Sheffield has found it hard to adapt to the new conditions for industry globally where smart thinking, rapid deployment of technology and a global mindset are all highly important. Unemployment in the city – as measured by the numbers claiming social security allowances on the grounds of long-term joblessness – is a fifth higher than the national average. Average wages are 16 percent lower than in the United Kingdom as a whole. This is a measure of the fact that – even with a relatively large number of engineering-related businesses in the city – overall employment remains skewed towards low-remuneration industries such as services or unskilled manufacturing.
A report by Sheffield First, a public/private organisation in the city geared to efforts to boost the economy, states: “Sheffield does not make sufficient use of the skills in its population, with a lower density of highly skilled private sector jobs than in other parts of the UK.”  
While most of the local manufacturers are eager to link themselves to the long traditions of the city, not everyone among the city’s industrialists  believes accenting the Sheffield link is a good idea. In the vanguard of this thinking is Andrew Cook, the idiosyncratic chairman and owner of William Cook, a Sheffield company that is the country’s largest maker of steel castings, used in industries such as railways, military vehicles and sub-sea engineering.  One of the great survivors, Cook has been running William Cook since 1981 after he ousted his father from the job in a bitter family quarrel.
Today, William Cook employs 800 people and had sales last year of £90m, 90 percent of this exported. Cook always likes to speak of his company as being based in Yorkshire – the wider region where Sheffield is located – rather than in the city itself. He speaks witheringly of what he refers to as the “Sheffield manufacturing establishment.” The outspoken Cook reckons local business people do not do enough in adapting to new thinking and are  too keen to look back at the “glory days” of past success. “They [other Sheffield manufacturers] have a misplaced belief in their embedded superiority,” he says.
However Peter Birtles, a director of Sheffield Forgemasters – another big metals business in the city – rejects this view. He says that his company, along with most of the other important manufacturers in the city, would not still be in business were Cook’s criticisms correct. “We [at Sheffield Forgemasters] have had to adapt to new pressures and become increasingly innovative in order to keep ahead of rivals from around the world – not just from countries such as Germany and the United States, but from new competitors including China and India.”
With sales last year of £100m and 800 employees, Sheffield Forgemasters – which can trace its roots back to some of the pioneering metals businesses in Sheffield of the 18th century – makes large metal parts for industries such as nuclear power and production systems for gas and oil fields. Some four fifths of its annual sales are exported. Since 2005, the company has spent more than £50m on new capital investments, such as improvements to its massive steel forging presses, while also putting £10m over the past four years into developing new production techniques and materials. For instance, to find more accurate manufacturing methods.
“We feel we have to do this if we are to have a future,” says Birtles. “Everyone keeps telling us the Chinese and Indians are catching up [in western know-how and technology]. Of course in 10 years time they will be up to the level we are now. So what we have to do is to move ahead over this period so that – when this time comes – we will be perhaps three or four years in front of where they’ve got to then.”
Having talked to people such as Birtles – part of the modern breed of European industrialist who shows a mixture of innovative verve mixed with resilience and technological acumen – my visit to Sheffield gave me some optimism about the future for the city in manufacturing. Sheffield made its name as a key center in the first industrial revolution that started to shake up the world 150-200 years ago. There is every reason to think Sheffield could have an equally big impact during the new industrial revolution that is now evolving.
Photo © Global Manufacturing Festival: Sheffield.

domingo, 16 de junio de 2013

Krugman: La mecanización disruptiva llega a los trabajadores del conocimiento



Sympathy for the Luddites


NYT

In 1786, the cloth workers of Leeds, a wool-industry center in northern England, issued a protest against the growing use of “scribbling” machines, which were taking over a task formerly performed by skilled labor. “How are those men, thus thrown out of employ to provide for their families?” asked the petitioners. “And what are they to put their children apprentice to?”


Those weren’t foolish questions. Mechanization eventually — that is, after a couple of generations — led to a broad rise in British living standards. But it’s far from clear whether typical workers reaped any benefits during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution; many workers were clearly hurt. And often the workers hurt most were those who had, with effort, acquired valuable skills — only to find those skills suddenly devalued.
So are we living in another such era? And, if we are, what are we going to do about it?
Until recently, the conventional wisdom about the effects of technology on workers was, in a way, comforting. Clearly, many workers weren’t sharing fully — or, in many cases, at all — in the benefits of rising productivity; instead, the bulk of the gains were going to a minority of the work force. But this, the story went, was because modern technology was raising the demand for highly educated workers while reducing the demand for less educated workers. And the solution was more education.
Now, there were always problems with this story. Notably, while it could account for a rising gap in wages between those with college degrees and those without, it couldn’t explain why a small group — the famous “one percent” — was experiencing much bigger gains than highly educated workers in general. Still, there may have been something to this story a decade ago.
Today, however, a much darker picture of the effects of technology on labor is emerging. In this picture, highly educated workers are as likely as less educated workers to find themselves displaced and devalued, and pushing for more education may create as many problems as it solves.
I’ve noted before that the nature of rising inequality in America changed around 2000. Until then, it was all about worker versus worker; the distribution of income between labor and capital — between wages and profits, if you like — had been stable for decades. Since then, however, labor’s share of the pie has fallen sharply. As it turns out, this is not a uniquely American phenomenon. A new report from the International Labor Organization points out that the same thing has been happening in many other countries, which is what you’d expect to see if global technological trends were turning against workers.
And some of those turns may well be sudden. The McKinsey Global Institute recently released a report on a dozen major new technologies that it considers likely to be “disruptive,” upsetting existing market and social arrangements. Even a quick scan of the report’s list suggests that some of the victims of disruption will be workers who are currently considered highly skilled, and who invested a lot of time and money in acquiring those skills. For example, the report suggests that we’re going to be seeing a lot of “automation of knowledge work,” with software doing things that used to require college graduates. Advanced robotics could further diminish employment in manufacturing, but it could also replace some medical professionals.
So should workers simply be prepared to acquire new skills? The woolworkers of 18th-century Leeds addressed this issue back in 1786: “Who will maintain our families, whilst we undertake the arduous task” of learning a new trade? Also, they asked, what will happen if the new trade, in turn, gets devalued by further technological advance?
And the modern counterparts of those woolworkers might well ask further, what will happen to us if, like so many students, we go deep into debt to acquire the skills we’re told we need, only to learn that the economy no longer wants those skills?
Education, then, is no longer the answer to rising inequality, if it ever was (which I doubt).
So what is the answer? If the picture I’ve drawn is at all right, the only way we could have anything resembling a middle-class society — a society in which ordinary citizens have a reasonable assurance of maintaining a decent life as long as they work hard and play by the rules — would be by having a strong social safety net, one that guarantees not just health care but a minimum income, too. And with an ever-rising share of income going to capital rather than labor, that safety net would have to be paid for to an important extent via taxes on profits and/or investment income.
I can already hear conservatives shouting about the evils of “redistribution.” But what, exactly, would they propose instead?