martes, 18 de junio de 2013

¿Qué es la economía neoclásica anyway?

What is "neoclassical" economics?



New rule: the term "neo-" shall never be applied to anything other than Keanu Reeves' character in The Matrix.

OK, just kidding. But it's time to talk about one of my pet reeves...er, peeves - the use of the term "neoclassical economists".

If you read econ blogs, especially blogs by "heterodox" bloggers (Austrians, Post-Keynesians, MMTers, etc.), then you know that the term "neoclassical" gets slung around quite a lot, usually as a perjorative. See hereherehere, and here for just a few examples. The idea is that "neoclassical" econ is the dominant paradigm, and that the "heterodox" schools are competing paradigms that lost out, and were, to use Kuhn's terminology, "simply read out of the profession...and subsequently ignored."

Well and good, but I have two problems with the way the term is used. First, I don't like the sloppiness of the way it's defined, and second, I don't like its application to people as opposed to ideas.

What kind of economics counts as "neoclassical"? Wikipedia defines it thus:
Neoclassical economics is a term variously used for approaches to economics focusing on the determination of prices, outputs, and income distributions in markets through supply and demand, often mediated through a hypothesized maximization of utility by income-constrained individuals and of profits by cost-constrained firms employing available information and factors of production, in accordance with rational choice theory.
OK, makes sense. Assumption of individual rationality, utility maximization, and supply/demand. One or more of things terms probably describes most of mainstream economics theory.

But does it describe most of maintstream economics researchTheory papers have declined from over half of top-journal econ papers in 1963 to less than 28% in 2011. Empirical papers make up most of the rest, with experimental economics growing to just over 8%.

How many of those empirical papers should be described as "neoclassical"? Some of them, no doubt. Some of them explicitly include neoclassical models; others test neoclassical theories developed in other papers. But many mainstream empirical papers contain no reference whatsoever to individual rationality, utility maximization, and supply/demand.

For example, take this famous paper by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, entitled "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation" (American Economic Review, 2001). This paper measures the effect of institutions on growth. It does not make use of a neoclassical model. It does not test a neoclassical model. It does not include any assumption of rationality (or indeed, any model of individual behavior at all!). It does not include utility or supply/demand.

For an example from experimental econ, take "Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment", by Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (American Economic Review, 2005). This experiment establishes conditions under which financial markets in a laboratory will result in asset price bubbles and crashes. No assumption of rationality is made, no model is referenced or tested, and no ideas of supply/demand or utility make an appearance.

These are mainstream papers, published in the most mainstream of econ journals. And there are many others like them. Does their very mainstream-ness automatically make them "neoclassical", even though they have zero of the elements that are commonly held to define neoclassical economics? If so, then I contend that the word "neoclassical" has lost all useful meaning.

"Neoclassical" should not be synonymous with "mainstream". "Neoclassical" should be used to describe a certain set of economic methods and/or ideas. Instead, "neoclassical" seems often to be used to describe anything that does not fall within a small well-known set of "heterodox" paradigms. I think that is wrong. The net effect of that type of thinking will be to block people from thinking of new ideas, because it defines any really new approach as "neoclassical". So people who want to subvert or replace econ's dominant paradigm will be shepherded toward old alternatives such as Austrianism, Post-Keynesianism, etc.

My second objection is related to the first. People who sling around the word "neoclassical" often apply it to people rather than ideas. "Oh, he's a neoclassical economist." Etc. Does that make sense? Take Daron Acemoglu for example. He writes papers that are clearly neoclassical. But he writes others that have none of the neoclassical elements. Should he be pigeonholed as a "neoclassical"? It seems obvious to me that he should not, but he probably is.

Or take me. I've never written a paper with individual optimization or supply/demand in it (though I'm working on some now). I've just done experiments and empirical stuff that didn't rely on any neoclassical idea. But people in the blogosphere have no qualms labeling me a "neoclassical", apparently because I've discussed neoclassical ideas on my blog. Not that I am mad, but it seems silly.

Shouldn't a researcher be free to work with a number of different types of analysis, and draw on a number of intellectual traditions, without getting pigeonholed? Isn't it counterproductive to scientific progress to enforce a "one-drop rule" for paradigms, so that any researcher who ever writes "max u(x)" on a legal pad is forever labeled a "neoclassical", and every paper (s)he ever writes as a "neoclassical" paper?

To reiterate, I suspect that the net effect of all this "neoclassical"-slinging is to discourage revolutions in econ. There are probably lots of revolutionary-minded young economists out there who would love to subvert the neoclassical paradigm. But when they try to find compatriots outside of the mainstream, they are told that if they don't join one of the pre-existing revolutionary groups, then they're a "neoclassical" and should go play with their fellow "neoclassicals". Which may have the effect of pushing them back into the arms of the actual neoclassicals, who of course are happy to welcome them into the fold...while the ancient "heterodox" movements retain their claim to be the only "real" revolutionaries out there...

A stable equilibrium, if you will.

Noah's Opinion

lunes, 17 de junio de 2013

Sobre el mejor sistema educativo del mundo...

El secreto de uno de los mejores sistemas educativos del mundo


El sentido de la responsabilidad está arraigado en la cultura finlandesa.
No son los que más invierten en educación (menos del 7% del PIB), ni los que imponen la mayor carga horaria a los niños en las escuelas. Tampoco se inclinan por dar cantidades excesivas de tarea para la casa; y, a la hora de evaluar formalmente el éxito del proceso de aprendizaje, un par de exámenes nacionales cuando los jóvenes dejan la escuela, a los 18 años, les basta.

Entonces, ¿cómo es posible que los alumnos finlandeses siempre ocupen los primeros puestos en las listas internacionales que evalúan los niveles educativos?

En el informe más reciente de PISA -siglas en inglés del Programa Internacional para la Evaluación de Estudiantes de la OCDE (Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos)- de 2009, Finlandia ocupa el puesto número dos en ciencia, el número tres en lectura y el número seis en matemáticas.

Esta evaluación se realiza cada tres años (los resultados de los exámenes de 2012 se publicarán en diciembre de 2013). En 2006, por ejemplo, Finlandia se estableció en los primeros dos puestos en las tres áreas.

Mientras en América Latina las protestas estudiantiles -más recientemente las de Chile y Colombia- ocurren con frecuencia, Finlandia parece haber encontrado un modelo -de educación gratuita de principio a fin y donde las escuelas privadas casi no existen- que tiene a los maestros y a los estudiantes contentos por igual.


La educación a grandes rasgos


Idea básica: igualdad de oportunidades.
Los niños empiezan la escuela a los 7 años.
Casi todas las escuelas son públicas (el número de escuelas privadas es ínfimo).
Toda la educación es gratuita (desde el preescolar hasta la universidad)
La comida y los materiales de estudio también son gratuitos.
Durante los primeros seis años de primaria es el mismo maestro para casi todas las asignaturas.
Jornada escolar: de 8.30 - 9 a 15 hs., con media hora de almuerzo.
Exámenes nacionales cuando los alumnos tienen 18 años
Promedio de alumnos por clase: 23.
Clases mixtas (mujeres y varones, y diferentes grados de capacidad).
Maestros debe tener una maestría para ejercer la docencia.

El orgullo de ser maestro


Son muchos los factores que hacen que la educación en Finlandia sea una de las mejores del mundo, pero uno de los temas clave, según varios expertos consultados por BBC Mundo, es la calidad de los profesores.

"El profesorado tiene un nivel de formación extraordinaria, con una selección previa tan exigente que no se compara con ninguna otra en el mundo", le explica a BBC Mundo Xavier Melgarejo, un psicólogo y psicopedagogo español que empezó a estudiar el sistema educativo en Finlandia hace más de una década.

"Sólo entra en las facultades de educación gente con notas por encima de nueve, nueve y medio sobre diez. Son muy exigentes. Se les hacen pruebas de lectura, sensibilidad artística, de dominio de algún instrumento, de comunicación... Como resultado, las universidades sólo reclutan a un 10% de los estudiantes que se presentan.

Y para ejercer la docencia todos los maestros necesitan hacer una maestría.


La contraparte de esta exigencia es el reconocimiento. No necesariamente en términos económicos, ya que los sueldos de los educadores no presentan grandes diferencias con el resto de Europa (según la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico, OCDE, el salario básico de una maestro de primaria es de entre US$29.000 y US$39.000 anuales), sino sociales.

"Los maestros son considerados profesionales académicos y tienen la responsabilidad de desarrollar su trabajo, por eso no se ejerce sobre ellos un control excesivo", le explica a BBC Mundo Anita Lehikoinen, Secretaria Permanente del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura de Finlandia.
Nurmi

"Aquí no es como en otros sitios, no tenemos tantas normas", dice Hilkka-Roosa Nurmi, profesora de idiomas.

"Esta profesión atrae a tanta gente porque ser maestro es un honor en Finlandia. Probablemente sea la profesión más valorada", acota Melgarejo.

"Yo no soñaba con ser profesora, pero ahora me dedico a esta profesión y me gusta mucho", explica Hilkka-Roosa Nurmi, una profesora de español e inglés que tiene experiencia como docente de estas lenguas en su país y en España.

"Aquí no es como en otros sitios, no tenemos tantas normas. Podemos elegir cómo enseñamos. Tenemos más libertad. Pero esto significa también más responsabilidad", dice.

Tú vales lo que sabes


Otra de las razones por las que el sistema finlandés funciona es, en gran medida, porque la escuela es sólo uno de los engranajes del proceso educativo. Las otras variables de peso son la familia y la sociedad -de tradición luterana- donde hay un elevado sentido de la responsabilidad y donde se valora a las personas "por su formación y no por su situación socioeconómica", dice Melgarejo.

Para darnos una idea, "en la cultura luterana uno se salva cuando lee la Biblia, se llega a Dios a través de la palabra escrita". Y aunque hoy día las iglesias no estén muy llenas, el valor de aprender a leer y escribir ha quedado profundamente arraigado en la cultura finlandesa, agrega Melgarejo.

En esto coincide Lehikoinen: "la mayoría de los hogares están suscritos a uno o varios periódicos y ésta es una tradición que luego se pasa a los niños", señala.

El sentido de la responsabilidad está arraigado en la cultura finlandesa.

Los medios indirectamente también ayudan al aprendizaje de la lectura. "Todos los programas de televisión en lengua original, la mayoría en inglés, están subtitulados y eso impulsa a los niños a aprender a leer y a aumentar la velocidad lectora", señala Melgarejo.

Pero también los finlandeses apuestan por la educación porque saben que como país pequeño, rodeado de vecinos poderosos como Rusia o Suecia y sin un arsenal de recursos naturales a su disposición, la cultura -su dominio en el ámbito del conocimiento- es lo que lo que les da la posibilidad de competir en una economía global.

Y puertas adentro, la excelencia en el nivel educativo se traduce "en un grado importante de cohesión social, que les permite a los finlandeses sentir que son parte de la sociedad, incluso en tiempos de crisis", explica Lehikoinen.

Gasto público en educación, total (% del PIB)


Finlandia: 6,8%
Suecia: 7,3%
Dinamarca: 8,7%
Argentina: 6%
Cuba: 13,1%
Chile: 4,2%
México: 5,3%
Estados Unidos: 5,4%
Fuente: Banco Mundial 2009

Lecciones para América Latina


Cuando se dieron a conocer los resultados de la primera evaluación PISA en el año 2000, el gobierno se vio inundado de visitas de delegaciones extranjeras que acudían a Finlandia para descubrir los secretos de la maravilla nórdica e implementarlos en sus propios países.

Alemania por ejemplo, azorada por sus resultados mediocres en la prueba, tomó nota del programa finlandés e introdujo reformas en su sistema.

¿Pero qué posibilidad tienen los países de América Latina, donde la educación pública está lejos de ser un orgullo, donde el sueldo de los maestros no está a la altura de sus responsabilidades y donde no existe un estado de bienestar como en algunos países europeos, de implementar un sistema educativo como el de Finlandia?

"No puedes copiar y pegar el sistema entero", le dice a BBC Mundo Andreas Schleicher, responsable de las evaluaciones PISA, "pero puedes ver cómo los finlandeses saben quién es un buen maestro, cómo los reclutan, cómo les asignan las clases o cómo se aseguran de que cada niño se beneficie de lo que le enseñan".

Melgarejo también cree que se pueden importar ciertos elementos, como mejorar la selección de buenos maestros, fomentar las bibliotecas públicas -ampliamente concurridas en Finlandia- y hacer que las familias contribuyan al proceso de escolarización.

Y quizá una lección útil para América Latina sea aprender cómo Finlandia afronta los cambios en el ámbito de la educación.

"Todo se basa en la confianza mutua y en la construcción de un consenso. Cuando planteamos grandes reformas educativas, por ejemplo, siempre involucramos a los maestros y a los alumnos, no se trata de órdenes del gobierno que los educadores tienen que acatar, son reformas que hemos preparado juntos", afirma Lehikoinen.

Después esta descripción de Lehikoinen, Melgarejo y Schleicher, uno podría tender a imaginarse una clase en Finlandia como una situación idílica: un grupo de niños obedientes escuchando embelesados una clase magistral que interrumpen de tanto en tanto con una pregunta inteligente.

Nada más lejos de la realidad. Los niños hacen las mismas travesuras que en cualquier parte del mundo. Incluso, a veces, "cuando hacen las mediciones de educación es una paradoja porque aunque les va muy bien, cuando les preguntan si les gusta la escuela, siempre dicen que no. Quizá eso se deba al espíritu independiente de nuestros niños", concluye Lehikoinen.

domingo, 16 de junio de 2013

Videos: Cómo funciona el blanqueo de divisas

Krugman: La mecanización disruptiva llega a los trabajadores del conocimiento



Sympathy for the Luddites


NYT

In 1786, the cloth workers of Leeds, a wool-industry center in northern England, issued a protest against the growing use of “scribbling” machines, which were taking over a task formerly performed by skilled labor. “How are those men, thus thrown out of employ to provide for their families?” asked the petitioners. “And what are they to put their children apprentice to?”


Those weren’t foolish questions. Mechanization eventually — that is, after a couple of generations — led to a broad rise in British living standards. But it’s far from clear whether typical workers reaped any benefits during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution; many workers were clearly hurt. And often the workers hurt most were those who had, with effort, acquired valuable skills — only to find those skills suddenly devalued.
So are we living in another such era? And, if we are, what are we going to do about it?
Until recently, the conventional wisdom about the effects of technology on workers was, in a way, comforting. Clearly, many workers weren’t sharing fully — or, in many cases, at all — in the benefits of rising productivity; instead, the bulk of the gains were going to a minority of the work force. But this, the story went, was because modern technology was raising the demand for highly educated workers while reducing the demand for less educated workers. And the solution was more education.
Now, there were always problems with this story. Notably, while it could account for a rising gap in wages between those with college degrees and those without, it couldn’t explain why a small group — the famous “one percent” — was experiencing much bigger gains than highly educated workers in general. Still, there may have been something to this story a decade ago.
Today, however, a much darker picture of the effects of technology on labor is emerging. In this picture, highly educated workers are as likely as less educated workers to find themselves displaced and devalued, and pushing for more education may create as many problems as it solves.
I’ve noted before that the nature of rising inequality in America changed around 2000. Until then, it was all about worker versus worker; the distribution of income between labor and capital — between wages and profits, if you like — had been stable for decades. Since then, however, labor’s share of the pie has fallen sharply. As it turns out, this is not a uniquely American phenomenon. A new report from the International Labor Organization points out that the same thing has been happening in many other countries, which is what you’d expect to see if global technological trends were turning against workers.
And some of those turns may well be sudden. The McKinsey Global Institute recently released a report on a dozen major new technologies that it considers likely to be “disruptive,” upsetting existing market and social arrangements. Even a quick scan of the report’s list suggests that some of the victims of disruption will be workers who are currently considered highly skilled, and who invested a lot of time and money in acquiring those skills. For example, the report suggests that we’re going to be seeing a lot of “automation of knowledge work,” with software doing things that used to require college graduates. Advanced robotics could further diminish employment in manufacturing, but it could also replace some medical professionals.
So should workers simply be prepared to acquire new skills? The woolworkers of 18th-century Leeds addressed this issue back in 1786: “Who will maintain our families, whilst we undertake the arduous task” of learning a new trade? Also, they asked, what will happen if the new trade, in turn, gets devalued by further technological advance?
And the modern counterparts of those woolworkers might well ask further, what will happen to us if, like so many students, we go deep into debt to acquire the skills we’re told we need, only to learn that the economy no longer wants those skills?
Education, then, is no longer the answer to rising inequality, if it ever was (which I doubt).
So what is the answer? If the picture I’ve drawn is at all right, the only way we could have anything resembling a middle-class society — a society in which ordinary citizens have a reasonable assurance of maintaining a decent life as long as they work hard and play by the rules — would be by having a strong social safety net, one that guarantees not just health care but a minimum income, too. And with an ever-rising share of income going to capital rather than labor, that safety net would have to be paid for to an important extent via taxes on profits and/or investment income.
I can already hear conservatives shouting about the evils of “redistribution.” But what, exactly, would they propose instead?

sábado, 15 de junio de 2013

Dos diagramas para toda la historia económica mundial

World economic history in two diagrams

Gregory Clark opens A Farewell to Alms with a strong claim:
The basic outline of world economic history is surprisingly simple. Indeed it can be summarized in one diagram: figure 1.1.
Clark (2007) Figure 1.1
I like Clark’s claim, but I’m now convinced that we need a second. From Michael Kremer’s Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990:

Figure I plots the growth rate of population against its level from prehistoric times to the present.
Even though there was negligible per person income growth through the Malthusian era, technological change was accelerating. As more people leads to more ideas (as there are more people to come up with them), a larger population leads to faster technological progress. Technological progress in turn allows for further population growth. The resulting pattern is faster than exponential growth in technology and population – a dynamic that does not show up in Clark’s chart.
If I were to stretch it to a third diagram I would want something that captures the dynamism of the Malthusian era – population bottlenecks, different rates of growth across different populations and the like – but I’m not sure what that chart would look like yet.

jueves, 13 de junio de 2013

Racionados con VISA

Racionamiento con VISA en Venezuela

Una pantalla de un cajero desautoriza la compra para un cliente en un supermercado bolivariano al haber superado la cuota de racionamiento diario. Paradójicamente el supermercado ofrece pagarlo con una tarjeta de crédito que es una herramienta de financiamiento del consumo. Y todo esto en un país con altísimas rentas petroleras. Es todo un símbolo de la capacidad de gestión estatal.

Definiendo "reservas"

Defining “Reserves”

Angry Bear

I’ve run into quite a bit of confusion in conversations discussing bank reserves, and found occasion to get precise on the usage in recent comments. I thought I’d share it with others. This has been vetted by several who are more worthy than I, so I feel quite confident in offering it up.
1. “Reserve balances.” These are banks’ deposits at the Fed. Similar to your credit balance in your checking account (except in “bank money”). They’re liabilities of the Fed, assets of the banks. They appear and are identified as such on banks’ (and the Fed’s) balance sheets.
2. “Required reserves.” A regulatory amount (percentage of deposits) that banks are required to hold in specified “safe” assets — significant examples being treasuries, vault cash, gold (in their vaults or the Fed’s), and…reserve balances. The term “required reserves” does not appear on banks’ balance sheets.
3. “Excess reserve( balance)s.” I add “balances” because this explicitly refers to that particular type of holdings — deposits at the Fed. A bank could (in theory) have sufficient required reserves held in treasuries and vault cash, so all of its reserve balances could be “excess reserves.” (Depending on which of the bank’s assets you might want to point to and arbitrarily call its “required reserves.” That thing is a regulatory (pro)portion, not a specific set of financial assets, or a balance-sheet entry.)
What’s funny here: Excess Reserves are explicitly not reserves in the sense of “funds that are required to be ring-fenced under law so depositors can withdraw their money or transactions can clear.” By definition, they’re the banks’ deposits at the Fed that are not ring-fenced.
So excess reserves are not actually “reserves.” No wonder people get confused.
Takeaway:
Required reserves aren’t necessarily held in the form of reserve balances.
Reserve balances are not necessarily required reserves.
(Which is why I would prefer a better term than “reserve balances.” Fed deposits?)

martes, 11 de junio de 2013

El declive económico francés

Bonjour Tristesse: The Economic and Political Decline of France

By Mathieu von Rohr
Photos

REUTERS
France is in the grip of a crisis. As both its economy and European influence weaken, scandal has hobbled its political elite. The country needs drastic overhaul, but President Hollande does nothing but waver and 
Der Spiegel

Judging by the imperial magnificence of the Elysee Palace, France has never ceased to be a world power. Rooms with five-meter (16-foot) ceilings, gilded chandeliers, candelabras and elaborate stucco work are guarded by members of the Republican Guard, who parade in front of the palace gates with their plumes of feathers and bayonets.

François Hollande
 never intended to become a king, but rather a "normal president," as he put it, and now he has to play one nonetheless. He occasionally seems like an actor who has somehow ended up in the wrong play.The man in charge, on the other hand, seems lonely and small in his palace. He is surrounded by court ushers who make sure that glasses and writing sets are perfectly arranged, and when he enters a conference room, they call out grandly "Monsieur le Président de la République!", to give his attendants time to stand up for him.
Outside, throughout the country, unemployment reaches new highs each month, factories are shut down daily, hundreds of thousands take to the streets to protest gay marriage, and the French are increasingly outraged over a barrage of new political scandals as the country hovers on the cusp of waning global relevance. Yet this roar of dissatisfaction doesn't permeate the walls of Hollande's world. Here, it is quiet, very quiet.
Shortly after moving into his new official residence, Hollande warned his staff that in a palace it is easy to feel protected, and he insisted that he did not want to be "locked in." But that is precisely what is happening, as evidenced by the documentary film "Le Pouvoir" (The Power), which recently debuted in French theaters and whose creators accompanied Hollande during the brutal first eight months of his presidency.
Elite in a Bubble
They paint an image of a likeable man who seems to spend a lot of time rewriting speeches prepared by his staff. As you watch him in the movie, you start to wonder: Does he do all the important things when no one's watching or does he really spends most of his time on the unimportant? However, the main subject of the film is not the president, but rather the reality bubble in the country's top echelons. Not just Hollande, but also most of his cabinet ministers, still reside in Parisian city palaces that predate the French Revolution, and perhaps that's a problem.
A justice minister who spends her days in the Hôtel de Bourvallais on Place Vendôme, next door to the Hotel Ritz, a culture minister who goes to work at the magnificent Palais Royal, a prime minister whose offices are in the grand Hôtel Matignon and a president who resides at the Elysee Palace, they all need a great deal of inner strength to avoid losing their connection to reality. It's a difficult proposition, because Paris's settings of power convey the message that France is big, rich and beautiful.
But the mood hanging over the country is depressed. France is in the midst of the biggest crisis of the Fifth Republic. It feels as if the French model had reached an end stage, not just in terms of the economy, but also in politics and society. A country that long dismissed its problems is going through a painful process of adjustment to reality and, as was the case last week, can now expect to be issued warnings by the European Commission and prompted to implement reforms.
France's plight was initially apparent in the economy, which has been stagnating for five years, because French state capitalism no longer works. But the crisis reaches deeper than that. At issue is a political class that more than three quarters of the population considers corrupt, and a president who, this early in his term, is already more unpopular than any of his predecessors. At issue is a society that is more irreconcilably divided into left and right than in almost any other part of Europe. And, finally, at issue is the identity crisis of a historically dominant nation that struggles with the fact that its neighbor, Germany, now sets the tone on the continent.
The French economy has been in gradual decline for years, without any president or administration having done anything decisive about it. But now, ignoring the problems is no longer an option. The economy hasn't grown in five years and will even contract slightly this year. A record 3.26 million Frenchmen are unemployed, youth unemployment is at 26.5 percent, consumer purchasing power has declined, and consumption, which drives the French economy, is beginning to slow down, as well.
There is a more positive side of the story, which sometimes pales in the face of all the bad news. France is the world's fifth-largest economy, and interest rates for government bonds have been at historic lows for months. The country is far from being on the verge of bankruptcy and cannot be compared with Italy or Spain, and certainly not with Greece. Nevertheless, France is ailing. And looking weak is something the French themselves hate more than anything else.
Consequences of French Decline
This mixture of factors could jeopardize the entire European structure. For one thing, if France continues to decline, more and more responsibility will be shifted to Germany. "Germany cannot carry the euro on its shoulders alone indefinitely," writes Harvard University economist Kenneth Rogoff. "France needs to become a second anchor of growth and stability."
Another problem is that the European Union is losing its standing in France at a more dramatic pace than in any other EU member state. According to a study by the Pew Research Center, the public approval of the EU in France has declined from 60 to 41 percent in only a year. This might be owed to the uncomfortable fact that Brussels is increasingly treating France as a problem and not as one of Europe's supporting columns, and many French citizens have started to see the terms 'Brussels' and (German Chancellor) 'Angela Merkel' as synonymous.
But is the EU to blame for the France's crisis? Can Europe truly be held responsible for the fact that the government is behind 57 percent of total economic output in France? That government debt has risen to more than 90 percent of the gross domestic product? Is it Germany's fault that, for decades, French administrations have failed to make the country's business environment more competitive? And has anyone in Brussels demanded that a fifth of all workers in France be employed by the government?
France may be ailing, but it still has a lot going for it. It is home to successful major corporations, such as the luxury brand group LVMH, tire manufacturer Michelin and many pharmaceutical companies. The country has an efficient healthcare system, the highest birthrate in Europe and healthier demographics than Germany, fostered by tax breaks for families, the acceptance of working mothers as a fact of life and a corresponding system of full-day childcare.
But the French welfare state costs money, a lot of money. The country has neglected to make decisions on how much its individual achievements are worth, and how certain luxurious aspects of life it has come to appreciate could be modified to conform to not-so-luxurious realities, including the 35-hour workweek, a retirement age of 60 for some workers and unemployment benefits of up to €6,200 ($8,122) a month. As a result, there is a sense of gridlock, and a sour public mood is following on the heels of bad economic news.
Stuck in Past Grandeur?
France has an illustrious past, of which it is justifiably proud, but its historic success also prevents it from clearly recognizing the need for reforms. The omnipotent, bloated central government, which also controls the economy, should have been reformed long ago. The privileges of the Paris political elite are so outdated that they have become intolerable, and many bribery and corruption scandals are undermining an already fragile political legitimacy.
It cannot be accidental that France's leading politicians increasingly refer to their country as the "grande nation." Since the election campaign, President Hollande has hardly missed an opportunity to invoke the nation's greatness. With some dialectical malice, one could see this as evidence that France's greatness is now becoming a relic, but it certainly reflects the self-hypnosis of a nation whose stature is in the process of shrinking.
"Our soldiers demonstrated our role," Hollande said recently in a major press conference at the Elysée Palace, as he praised one of his rare successes, the military operation in Mali. "Namely that of a great nation that can influence the balance of power in the world."
There is an increasingly stark contrast between the feigned grandiosity of the president's appearances and the faintheartedness of his daily actions. The obstructionism and inflexibility that prevail throughout the entire country can only be eliminated through deep-seated renewal. But so far Hollande, who promised "change" in his campaign, has been more conspicuous for his hesitation than his courage.
Since this spring, Hollande has been viewed by most commentators as the nice "Grandpa" in the Elysee Palace, who lacks the gumption to address the country's serious structural problems. The French constitution grants the office of the president more power than is allotted any other leader of the Western world. Besides, his Socialist Party holds significant majorities in the National Assembly, the Senate and even in regional governments.
In other words, Hollande could get down to business on any day he chooses. He could reform the country as he wished, if only that were his objective. But no one -- not citizens, not journalists and possibly not even his cabinet ministers -- knows what he wants and if indeed he wants anything at all.

Does he aim to be France's great reformer but lacks the courage to defy the left wing of his party, as a member of the German government believes? Or is it that he clings to his party's old formulas, wants to change as little as possible and is waiting for the day when the recovery happens on its own?


lunes, 10 de junio de 2013

Equidad social: En Finlandia, todos nacen iguales en la misma caja


Por qué los bebés de Finlandia duermen en cajas de cartón




Durante 75 años, las mujeres embarazadas en Finlandia han recibido cajas de cartón del Estado. Es como un paquete inicial con ropa, sábanas y juguetes que a su vez puede ser usado como camita. Muchos argumentan que esta política ha ayudado a que al país nórdico sea una de las naciones con menor tasa de mortalidad infantil en el mundo.
Se trata de una tradición que data de la década de los años 30 y busca dar a todos los niños finlandeses, sin importar su condición social, un comienzo de vida equitativo.


El paquete de maternidad, un regalo del gobierno, está disponible a todas las que esperan un bebé.
Contiene monitos, sacos de dormir, ropa para el aire libre, productos para el baño, así como pañales y un colchón pequeño.
Con el colchón en el fondo, la caja se convierte en la primera cama del bebé. Muchos niños tienen su primera siesta dentro la seguridad que brindan las paredes de cartón.
Las madres pueden escoger entre tomar la caja o recibir efectivo (unos US$214), pero el 95% opta por la caja, pues su valor es mucho mayor.
Esta tradición nació en 1938. Al principio era sólo para familias de bajos recursos, algo que cambió en 1949.
"No sólo fue ofrecido a todas las futuras madres, sino que la nueva legislación también significó que, para obtener la caja, tenían que visitar a un médico y una clínica pública prenatal antes de los cuatro meses de embarazo", cuenta Heidi Liesivesi, quien trabaja en Kela, la institución de seguridad social finlandesa.
La caja les daba a las madres lo que necesitaban para cuidar a sus bebés, pero también ayudaba a guiar a las mujeres hacia los brazos de los profesionales de la salud del Estado de bienestar naciente de Finlandia.

Recién nacido durmiendo
En Finlandia, el índice de mortalidad por nacimientos ha bajado de más de 70 por cada 1.000 bebés a menos de cinco.

Cambio brusco


En los años 30, el país nórdico era muy pobre y la mortalidad infantil era alta, con 65 muertes por cada 1.000 nacimientos. Pero estos datos mejoraron rápidamente en las décadas siguientes.
Mika Gissler, un profesor del Instituto Nacional de la Salud y Bienestar en Helsinki, ofrece varias razones para esto: a la caja de maternidad y los cuidados prenatales para todas las mujeres en los años 40 les siguieron, en los 60, un sistema de seguridad social nacional y una red de hospitales centralizada.
Con 75 años, la caja está ahora institucionalizada en Finlandia como la transición hacia la maternidad, algo que une a varias generaciones de mujeres.
Reija Klemetti, de 49 años, vive en Helsinki. Recuerda ir a la oficina de correos y recoger la caja de uno de sus seis hijos.
"Era emocionante recibirla y que de alguna forma fuera la primera promesa de bebé. Mi mamá, mis amigos y mis familiares estaban ilusionados con ver qué tipo de cosas recibiría y qué colores habían escogido para ese año".
Su suegra, de 78 años, contó en gran medida con la caja cuando tuvo al primero de sus cuatro hijos en los años 60. En ese punto, tenía poca idea de lo que podía necesitar.


Más recientemente, la hija de Klemetti, Solja, compartió con 23 años la emoción que su madre sintió una vez, cuando se hizo poseedora de la "primera cosa substancial" incluso antes que el bebé. Ahora tiene dos hijos.
"Es fácil saber en qué año nacieron los bebés, porque cada año cambia un poco la ropa que viene. Está bien comparar y pensar 'ese niño nació el mismo año que el mío'", dice Titta Vayrynen, una madre de 35 años que tiene dos hijos.



La caja de hoy en día


  • Colchón, funda de colchón, edredón, manta, saco de dormir / edredón para dormir
  • La misma caja funciona como una cuna
  • Traje para la nieve, gorro, guantes y botas aislantes
  • Traje ligero encapuchado y monos de punto
  • Calcetines y manoplas y sombrero y pasamontañas de punto
  • Monos y ropita en diferentes colores y estampados unisex
  • Toalla de baño con capucha, tijeras de uñas, cepillo de pelo, cepillo de dientes, termómetro de baño, crema de pañales, estropajo para el baño
  • Pañal de tela y trapos para limpiar a los bebés
  • Libro de imágenes y juguetes para la dentición
  • Parches para los pechos, condones



"Las más felices"

Algunas familias no podrían costear el contenido de la caja si no fuera gratuito, a pesar de que para Vayrynen fue más una cuestión de ahorrar dinero.
Ella trabajaba muchas horas cuando quedó embarazada de su primer hijo y agradeció no tener que buscar tiempo para salir de compras y comparar precios.
"Hubo un reciente informe en el que se asegura que las madres finlandesas son las más felices del mundo, y la caja es una de las cosas que me vienen a la mente. Nos cuidan muy bien, incluso ahora que algunos servicios públicos han sido recortados", agrega Vayrynen.
Cuando tuvo a su segundo hijo, Ilmari, ella optó por el dinero en efectivo en lugar de la caja y sencillamente volvió a usar todo lo que le habían dado para su primogénito Aarni.
Un niño también puede pasarle ropa a una niña y viceversa, pues los colores son deliberadamente neutrales.
El contenido de la caja ha cambiado bastante con el paso de los años.
Durante las décadas del 30 y del 40, tenían telas porque las madres estaban acostumbradas a confeccionar ropa de bebés.
Pero durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el algodón y los tejidos eran requeridos por el Ministerio de Defensa, así que en las cajas había sábanas de papel y un cobertor de tela.


En los años 50 hubo un incremento de la ropa fabricada, y en los 60 y 70 la indumentaria incorporó nuevas telas elásticas.

Sin desechables ni biberones

El saco de dormir apareció en 1968, y al año siguiente hubo pañales desechables por primera vez.
Pero no por mucho tiempo.
Con la llegada del nuevo siglo, retiraron los pañales desechables y regresaron los de tela, cumpliendo con lineamientos de protección del medio ambiente.
Motivar una buena maternidad y paternidad siempre ha sido parte de la política de la caja.
"Los bebés solían dormir en la misma cama que sus padres y se recomendó dejar de hacerlo", explica Panu Pulma, profesor de historia finlandesa y nórdica en la Universidad de Helsinki. "Incluir la caja como cama significó que la gente empezó a dejar que sus bebés durmieran aparte".
En determinado momento, las botellas de bebés (biberones o teteros) y los chupetes o chupones fueron retirados para promover la lactancia materna.
"Uno de los principales objetivos de todo el sistema ha sido lograr que las mujeres den más el pecho", dice Pulma, quien agrega que "ha funcionado".
El experto también piensa que incluir un libro de cuentos ilustrado ha tenido un efecto positivo, pues motiva a los niños a manipular libros y, un día, a leerlos.
Además de todo esto, Pulma asegura que esta caja es un símbolo.
Un símbolo de la idea de igualdad y de la importancia de los niños.


Historia de una caja

Caja de 1953
  • 1938: dos tercios de las mujeres que dieron a luz ese año fueron candidatas al subsidio en efectivo, la caja de maternidad o una mezcla de las dos. Desde el principio el paquete podía ser usado como una cuna en hogares más pobres, donde las condiciones higiénicas no eran las más apropiadas para el bebé.
  • 1940: a pesar de la escasez en tiempos de guerra, el programa continuó cuando muchos finlandeses perdieron sus casas en los bombardeos y evacuaciones
    .
  • 1942-6: El papel remplazó a la tela en artículos como envolturas de pañales y sábana para la madre.
  • 1949: El paquete es ofrecido a todas las madres en Finlandia, siempre y cuando se hicieran controles de salud prenatal (el paquete de la foto de arriba es de 1953).
  • 1957: Las telas y material para coser fueron remplazados por prendas ya confeccionadas.
  • 1969: Se añaden pañales desechables al paquete.
  • 1970: Con más mujeres trabajando, las ropas blancas se sustituyen por algodones elásticos y fáciles de lavar.
  • 2006: Se reintroducen los pañales de tela y se retira el biberón para fomentar la lactancia materna.